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Abstract
This thesis wants to contribute to the understanding of the role of col-
lective beliefs and incomplete information in the analysis of the dynamics
of inequality, growth and redistributive politics. Extensive evidence shows
that the difference in the political support for redistribution appears to re-
flect a difference in the social perceptions regarding the determinants of in-
dividual wealth and the underlying sources of income inequality. The the-
sis presents a theoretical framework of beliefs and redistribution which ex-
plains this evidence through multiple politico-economic equilibria. Differ-
ently from the recent literature which obtains multiple equilibria by mod-
eling agents characterized by psychological biases, my framework is based
on standard assumptions. Multiple equilibria originate frommultiple welfare-
maximizing levels of information for the society. Multiple welfare-maximizing
levels of information exist because increasing the informativeness of an
economy produces a trade-off between a decrease in adverse selection and
an increase inmoral hazard. The framework provides a newmicro-foundation
of incomplete information as an institutional feature and answers various
macroeconomic policy questions with different models.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This thesis wants to contribute to the understanding of the role of col-
lective beliefs and incomplete information in the analysis of the dynamics
of inequality, growth and redistributive politics. More specifically, focus-
ing on the role played by incomplete information, it offers new theoretical
insights which can help to answer the following four questions:
(i) Why is the case that very different patterns of redistribution and social
contracts are found across countries which are otherwise similar?
(ii) Why is it the case that also the beliefs which people hold about the
underlying determinants of wealth and the extent of social mobility are
very different across otherwise similar societies?
(iii) It appears that the societies which are characterized by the widespread
belief according to which “hard work, self-discipline and other factors un-
der individual control, other than luck, family of origin or other factors
outside individual control determine individual wealth”(e.g. the US) re-
distribute less than the societies which are characterized by the opposite
belief (e.g. European countries). Is it possible to describe those outcomes
relating beliefs, political and economic outcomes in terms of different equi-
libria? And which are the driving forces behind those different outcomes?
8
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(iv) Given that beliefs and incomplete information appear to play a crucial
role in the determination of political and economy outcomes, which are the
relative policy implications? Is there any role for institutions which can
affect the degree of information in the economy?
The way in which I address questions (i)-(iii) is by offering new insights
within a recently developed theoretical framework which analyzes the role
played by beliefs in the determination of political and economic outcomes.
This represents a still small but fast-growing field of research which is re-
ceiving increasing attention.1 One of the contributions of my thesis is to
take a first step towards a unification of such framework focusing on the
role played by incomplete information. The way in which I answer ques-
tion (iv) is bymaking a first step towards the development of a new theoret-
ical framework which can link this recent literature which is focused on the
role of beliefs to some more traditional strands of theoretical literature in
macroeconomics. The most natural link is the one with the dynamic mod-
els studying income distribution and intergenerational mobility, but there
is also a less obvious link to the literature on optimal taxation, especially
in its most recent developments which go under the name of new dynamic
public finance2.
1As the specific references will make clear, the leading scholars of this field can be consid-
ered to be Alberto Alesina, Roland Benabou, Edward Glaeser and Thomas Piketty among
others. Given the research question, it will be interesting to notice that most of the active
scholars in this field are European economists with established working experiences in the
US.
2See Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werning (2006) for a review of the this recent literature.
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Under a broader perspective, the thesis can be seen as a theoretical con-
tribution to the understanding of the role of wealth inequality in macroe-
conomics, which has been a research topic under increasing attention since
the early 90’s. In order to clarify better the contribution of the thesis, in
this chapter I present a critical review of the related literature and the main
results of thesis, respectively in sections 1.1 and 1.2.
1.1. Historical review of literature
The related literature is very vast and encompasses different fields. Of-
ten those different strands of literature have been separated. It is useful to
review those different fields in chronological order in order to have a better
understanding of the way in which they developed and of the questions
which are still unanswered.3
1.1.1. Income Distribution and Intergenerational Mobility in Neoclas-
sical Macroeconomics. The interest in the distribution of income used to
be central among classical economists. Distributional issues are still para-
mount for Post-Keynesian models focused on the distribution of income
among factor of productions. It is the seminal paper of Stiglitz (1969) to
be commonly considered the first modern analysis of the distribution of
wealth and income among individuals. The model of Stiglitz presents a
strong result of long run convergence in the dynamics of individual income
which parallels the seminal result obtained by Solow (1956) in the context
3It is inevitable to be reductive, but deeper reviews of those different fields already ex-
ist: Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimuller (2006), Piketty (1998), Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-
Penalosa (1999), Benabou (2005). I will refer to those when necessary.
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of country income. In the model of Stiglitz agents are endowedwith capital
(accumulated factor) and labor (non accumulated factor), markets are com-
petitive and both factors are paid at their marginal return. The assumptions
of diminishing returns to capital and of an identical concave saving func-
tion across individuals imply that individual wealth increases over time in
a concave fashion and eventually converges to a steady state value which
does not depend on the initial level of wealth. In other words, in the model
inequality across families is solely determined by the differences in the non
accumulated factors (i.e. the differences in individual skills) and when all
families are equally endowed with the non accumulated factor (i.e. skills
are homogenous across families) every family converges to the same level
of wealth. It is also shown that redistributive taxation decreases inequality
and increases the speed of convergency, but it does not have any effect on
aggregate output, specifically because it does not change individual saving
behavior which is exogenous. These results rely on the specific assump-
tions of the model and the following contributions have removed some of
the original exogenous elements seeking deepermicro-foundations. For ex-
ample, one element which can result in the absence of convergency and in
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the persistence of initial wealth differences is the possibility of different fer-
tility behaviors across families.4 Another important extension of the anal-
ysis of Stigliz is a deeper analysis of the individual saving choices. Bour-
guignon (1981) shows that a convex saving function can imply that initial
wealth differences determine different steady states. Saving choices have
also been micro-founded as decisions to leave bequests for the future gen-
eration and in this context the analysis gives insights about the dynamics
of intergenerational inequality and mobility. In the context of bequests two
main formalization have been used in the literature: one in which bequests
enter directly into the utility function of the parents (Atkinson (1980)) and
one in which parents care about their children’s utility per se (Becker and
Tomes (1979)). Those two alternative formulations can give different con-
clusions about the dynamics of accumulation, inequality and the effects of
redistributive taxation. Developing this type of analysis, Becker and Tomes
(1986) focus on the intergenerational transmission of abilities across gener-
ations and study the implications for the investments in human capital and
the resulting dynamics of inequality.5
It is fair to mention that until recent times, such research on income dis-
tribution and intergenerational mobility did not constitute a topic of ma-
jor interest in modern macroeconomics. Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimuller
(2006) illustrate this point extensively. They explain that the interest in the
4This point is already analyzed by Stiglitz (1969) and has a long tradition in economics.
James Meade wrote extensively about it (on this see Atkinson (1980)), Chu (1991) presents
a modern analysis of the effect of primogeniture on long-run inequality and mobility.
5See the review of Piketty (1998) for more on the literature on bequests and intergenera-
tional mobility.
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distribution of income used to be central among classical economists. Clas-
sical economists were very much concerned with the issue of how the out-
put of an economy (wages, profits and land rents) is divided among the
various classes in society, which for David Ricardo was even “the principal
problem of Political Economy”. However, it appears that income distribu-
tion became a topic of minor interest in recent decades. Atkinson and Bour-
guignon (2001) (page 7265) note that “in the second half of the century, there
were indeed times when interest in the distribution of income was at low
ebb, economists appearing to believe that differences in distributive out-
comes were of second order importance compared with changes in overall
economic performance.”6 According to Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimuller
(2006) this appears to be the case especially with regard to growth theo-
ries. They explain that early growth models were still strongly concerned
with distributional issues: Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) study how dis-
tribution should adjust to support growth and the same question is asked
in the post-Keynesian models of Kaldor (1955) and Pasinetti (1962) which
consider endogenously determined factor shares.7 According to Bertola,
Foellmi, and Zweimuller (2006), the subsequent neo-classical theoretical
developments removed distribution from the set of macroeconomic issues
6A similar point is extensively made by Atkinson (1997) showing the relatively small size
of the research concerned with income distribution, specifically for what concerns studies
on developed economies.
7Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimuller (2006) (chapter 4) present a brief review of a large litera-
ture spanning Physiocratic tableaus, Ricardian theory and post Keynesian growth models.
Asimakopoulos (1988) offers a more extensive review of this material.
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of interest, as micro-founding optimal choices and expectations relied heav-
ily on “representative agent”modeling strategies and the distribution of
income and wealth across consumers was viewed as a passive outcome
of aggregate dynamics. Nevertheless, Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimuller
(2006) discuss that factor shares affect individual savings and through this
channel they affect growth. For this reason they show that the implica-
tions of factor shares on growth can be also studied in the framework of
neo-classical growth theory, including the recent endogenous growth the-
ory started by Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and others.8 Similarly, even if
the analysis of income distribution is not the primary concern of the over-
lapping generations models of Diamond (1965) and the perpetual youth
model of Blanchard (1985), Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimuller (2006) show
how those models can give insights about the evolution of inequality and
various dynamics in terms of distribution can arise. A specific analysis of
problems of income distribution in a neo-classical framework with HARA
utility function is done by Chatterjee (1994).9
The interest in problems of inequality and income distribution has a
substantial come-back in the 90’s. One of the main reasons is that the data
showed a dramatic increase in inequality, especially in developed economies.
Another reason is that both at the empirical and at the theoretical level, the
research starts to point to the links from inequality to growth. In those
8See chapter 4 of Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimuller (2006). A review of the literature on
endogenous growth is done by Romer (1989).
9About those models see chapter 5 of Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimuller (2006).
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years, at the theoretical level there are two main ideas which bring back the
interest in inequality in macroeconomics: 1) models with imperfect finan-
cial markets and 2) models of political economy.
1.1.2. From inequality to growth: poverty traps and political economy.
The basic idea behind the effect of imperfect financial markets is that if poor
individuals are prevented from borrowing and hence cannot invest, then
in a dynamic context initial inequalities may persist and some dynasties
may remain stuck into a poverty trap. The paper of Loury (1981) repre-
sents the first example of the introduction of those ideas in the framework
of Becker and Tomes (1979). The seminal contribution of Galor and Zeira
(1993) develops this type of analysis and discusses the case that, because of
credit constraints, people whose wealth is below a certain threshold cannot
invest in human capital: this generates persistent inequality and the exis-
tence of poverty traps. In the model of Galor and Zeira (1993) the existence
of persistent inequality relies on both the assumptions of credit constraints
and threshold effects. Without credit constraints everybody would opti-
mally invest in human capital irrespective of one’s initial wealth, and all
dynasties would converge to the same wealth level. Conversely, without
the assumption of a fixed-size investment, poor dynasties could slowly ac-
cumulate by starting with small investment levels and eventually catch up
with the rich. It is the combination of non-convex technologies and credit
constraints that produce non-convexities in transition equations and the
possibility of poverty traps. More specifically, this combination gives rise
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to a dynamic model that is very similar to the Bourguignon (1981) model
with a non-convex saving function. The contributions which followed the
analysis of Galor and Zeira (1993) explored more sophisticated dynamic
implications of the credit constraints. One important finding is that credit
constraints can have important long-run effects and produce poverty traps
even in the absence of non-convexities and threshold levels in investments.
The most relevant contributions with this respect are those of Banerjee and
Newman (1993), Piketty (1997) and Aghion and Bolton (1997). Banerjee and
Newman (1993) consider a world where moral-hazard induced credit con-
straints prevent poor agents from investing in large projects but where rich
agents can use a technology to monitor poor agents working as wage earn-
ers. There are three possible occupations in the model: wage earners (who
are too poor to make any investment on their own), self-employed (who fi-
nance and run their own investment) and entrepreneurs (who finance large
investments and monitor wage earners). The equilibrium wage rate is de-
termined by the equality between the number of agents who do not have
other choice but being wage-earners and the number of wage-earners who
are required by the entrepreneurs, and thus depends on the entire wealth
distribution. This can generate long-run effects of the initial wealth distri-
bution: an initially large mass of poor agents with no other option than be-
coming a wage-earner leads to a low wage rate and little upward mobility
for wage earners, while an initially small mass of poor agents leads to high
wage rates and high mobility between wage-earners and self-employed,
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which reproduces the forces leading to high wage rates. Depending on
the initial distribution of wealth, the economy will there converge to differ-
ent possible long-run distributions associated to different long-run wage
rates. In a slightly different context Piketty (1997) considers a model where
agents can invest at any level according to a concave production function,
but where moral hazard in entrepreneurial effort leads to a credit-rationing
curve. Assuming that the interest rate is endogenously determined by the
demand and supply of capital, it is possible to show that depending on the
exact initial distribution of wealth there will exist different possible long-
run distributions of wealth associated to different long-run interest rates.
In this model the endogenous interest rate plays a role which is similar
to the endogenous interest wage rate in the model of Banerjee and New-
man (1993). The intuition is the following: initial distributions with a large
population of low-wealth agents lead to a high demand for capital and to
high interest rates, which in turn imply that it takes a long time for low-
wealth agents to accumulate and rebuild their collateral, so that the initially
large mass of poor agents is self-reproducing. Conversely, low initial inter-
est rates lead to high wealth mobility, high accumulation and low equilib-
rium interest rates. The steady-states with higher interest rates have at the
same time less wealth mobility and a lower aggregate output and capital
stock. Finally, the two-way interaction between the distribution of wealth
and equilibrium factor prices implied by credit constraints can also gener-
ate other interesting and empirically plausible development patterns. For
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instance, Aghion and Bolton (1997) show that this interaction can gener-
ate trajectories characterized by a declining price of capital and an endoge-
nous Kuznets curve. During the initial stage of development, little capital is
available, the equilibrium interest rate is high and strong credit constraints
imply that only the rich can invest, mobility is low and income inequalities
tend to widen. The capital accumulation of the rich progressively forces the
interest rate to drop, so that credit constraints become less binding, mobil-
ity rises and inequality begins to decline. It is important to stress that in
these models inequality has negative implications for growth because the
assumed concave production function implies that it is ex-ante optimal to
equalize investments across agents. A corollary is that, other things equal,
redistribution is ex-ante optimal as it achieves equalization of investments
in a world where this would be prevented by credit constraints. Never-
theless there could be a standard negative moral hazard effect of redistri-
bution in the case in which optimal individual effort decreases in the level
of redistribution. Aghion and Bolton (1997) show that in the presence of
moral hazard, effort decreases in the amount borrowed, because the more
an individual needs to borrow in order to get production started and the
smaller it is the incentive to supply effort, because a larger fraction of the
marginal returns from effort are shared with the lenders. Therefore in such
case they show that redistribution has only a beneficial effect as the effort
exerted by the lenders remains at the first best and the effort exerted by
the borrowers increase because of redistribution. Related group of papers
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specifically focus on the dynamics of human capital accumulation and in-
equality through the channels of schools’ financing 10 or the endogenous
sorting of agents into homogeneous communities or other “clubs”11.
The other influential contribution that has been introduced in the 90’s
is represented by the literature in which the prevailing level of redistri-
bution is not exogenous but it is the result of a voting process. This idea
has been introduced by the seminal paper of Meltzer and Richard (1981)
and the seminal contributions which introduced it in dynamic macroeco-
nomic models are those of Perotti (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and
Persson and Tabellini (1994). The main idea behind those models is that,
as in Meltzer and Richard (1981), given the median voter theorem, greater
inequality translates into a poorer median voter relative to the country’s
mean income and therefore the greater the inequality and the higher it is
the voted level of redistribution in the economy. High levels of redistribu-
tion in turn lower individual incentives to accumulate capital and hence
the result that inequality lowers growth. Such models have been quite in-
fluential, especially in bringing endogenous political choices into the big
picture. They also stimulated a great deal of discussion about the rela-
tionship between inequality, growth and redistribution. Some empirical
evidence challenged the conclusion on the basis of two different observa-
tions. The first observation is that it does not always seem to be the case
10See Benabou (1996b), Benabou (2002), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Gradstein and Just-
man (1997), Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) among others.
11See Benabou (1993), Benabou (1996a), Durlauf (1996), Durlauf (1997), Kremer and
Maskin (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) among others.
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that inequality is detrimental to growth, even though the evidence in favor
is quite large.12 The second and major challenge comes from the observa-
tion that it does not seem to be the case that more inequality implies higher
redistribution. Perotti (1994), Perotti (1996) andmost of the other studies re-
viewed by Benabou (1996c) find no relationship between inequality and the
share of government expenditures in GDP. Among advanced countries the
effect actually appears to be negative. This is suggested by many examples:
among industrial democracies the more unequal ones tend to redistribute
less and not more as theMeltzer and Richard (1981) framework would sug-
gest. The archetypal case is that of the United States versus (Western) Eu-
rope: pre-tax inequality is higher in the US than in Europe, nevertheless
Europe is characterized by more extensive redistributive policies than the
US. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) report that while the Gini coefficient in
the pre-tax income distribution in the US is 38.5 against 29.1 in Europe,
the income tax structure is more progressive in Europe, the overall size of
government is about 50 per cent larger in Europe than in the US (about 30
versus about 45 per cent of GDP) and the largest difference is represented
by transfers and other social benefits, where Europeans spend about twice
as much as Americans.13 The observation holds within Western Europe it-
self, where Scandinavian countries are both the most equal and the most
redistributive. Using panel data for 20 OECD countries, Rodriguez (1998)
12This point has represented a hot debate at the empirical level and I refer the reader to the
exhaustive reviews of Benabou (1996c), Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimuller (2006), Banerjee
and Duflo (2003), Bourguignon (2004).
13More extensive and detailed evidence about this can be found in Alesina, Glaeser, and
Sacerdote (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004).
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finds that pre-tax inequality has a significative negative effect on every ma-
jor category of social transfers as a fraction of GDP, as well as on the capital
tax rate.
This second challenge inspired a new group of theoretical models whose
major focus is to explain the described evidence relating inequality and
redistributive politics. These models achieve this result showing the ex-
istence of multiple equilibria: a Europe-type equilibrium characterized by
relatively lower inequality and higher redistribution versus a US-type equi-
librium characterized by relatively higher inequality and lower redistribu-
tion. The model of Benabou (2000) is a seminal model which arrives to
such conclusions. In the model of Benabou (2000) the prevailing level of
redistribution is still a voting outcome, but the relationship between in-
equality and redistribution is not monotonic. This feature is the result of
two assumptions. The first is again the presence of imperfect credit mar-
kets which, together with a concave objective function, implies that redis-
tributive policies can have a positive effect on aggregate output and ex-
ante welfare (as already discussed in the model of Galor and Zeira (1993)
and following ones). The second and novel element is an extension of the
standard voting model which aims to capture the idea that some groups
have more influence in the political process than others and – more specif-
ically – that in reality the poor vote with lower probability than the rich or
– to some extent – money buys political influence. In particular the result
of non monotonic relation between inequality and redistribution relies on
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the case that if the income distribution is right-skewed (and therefore the
median is below the mean) – differently from the standard voting model
– the pivotal voter can be richer than the median (but not richer than the
mean) and over some range increases in inequality imply that the pivotal
voter gets richer. Those features imply that the voted rate of redistribution
is a U shaped function of inequality. Starting from the case of no inequality
where there is unanimous support for redistribution, growing inequality
increases the fraction of agents rich enough to prefer lower levels of redis-
tribution, hence the downward sloping part. After a certain point the func-
tion becomes upward sloping as the standard Meltzer and Richard (1981)
effect dominates: rising number of poor will eventually impose more re-
distribution. Conversely, since redistribution relaxes the credit constraints
bearing on the poor’s , long-run inequality is a declining function of the
rate of redistribution. The features that redistribution is a U shaped func-
tion of inequality and inequality is a declining function of redistribution
creates the potential for multiple steady states (fixed points): mutually re-
inforcing high inequality and low redistribution (US-type equilibrium) or
low inequality and high redistribution (Europe-type equilibrium). Other
theoretical models which obtain multiple equilibria with similar features
are those of Saint-Paul (2001) and Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora, Storesletten,
and Zilibotti (2003). 14
14Both these models introduce more complicated problems of dynamic voting. As in the
case of Benabou (2000), also the result of Saint-Paul (2001) relies on the possibility that
over some range increases in inequality imply that the pivotal voter gets richer. Has-
sler, Rodriguez-Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003) develop a dynamic model with re-
peated voting. The model may have multiple voting equilibria in which individuals who
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The result about multiple equilibria can also be linked to the litera-
ture which focuses on the relation between inequality and technological
change.15 Benabou (2005) develops a theoretical model which introduces
such link in the framework of Benabou (2000). He develops an equilib-
rium model of how skill-biased technical change can affect inequality and
also how the composition of labor force and therefore inequality of human
capital affects the technological choices of firms. Importing this analysis
in the one of Benabou (2000) about inequality and political equilibrium, he
obtains a multiple equilibria model about the long run determination of
redistribution, technology and the inequality.
1.1.3. Beliefs and Redistributive Politics. The beliefs held by people
about the underlying determinants of individual wealth and social mobil-
ity appear to be strong determinants of the social contract. In the previous
section I have already referred to the evidence pointing to the significant
differences in the level of redistribution (social contract) across countries
and the evidence that across developed countries more unequal countries
seem to redistribute less, where the most striking difference is represented
by the US versus Europe. There are also striking differences across coun-
tries in the beliefs held by people about the underlying determinants of
expect high redistribution in the future invest little in education today, thereby increasing
the number of future beneficiaries (and hence supporters) of redistribution. By the same
argument large investments in education and low redistribution can be an equilibrium as
well.
15This literature is reviewed by Acemoglu (2002) and by Benabou (2005).
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individual wealth and the causes of poverty. Once again the most strik-
ing difference relates to the differences between the US and (Continental
Western) Europe. Since De Tocqueville (1835), many have noticed the ex-
ceptionalism or dream characterizing the American society, in other words
the dominant belief that everyone can become rich if wants so and mobil-
ity is high in the “land of opportunities”. De Tocqueville (1835) first and
many other sociologists and political scientists after him have pointed to
persistent differences in popular beliefs about social mobility in explaining
the persistent differences between US and European redistributive politics.
The differences in those beliefs across societies appear to be substantial.
Data from the World Values Survey reported by Alesina, Glaeser, and Sac-
erdote (2001) and Keely (2002) show that only 29 percent of Americans be-
lieve that the poor are trapped in poverty and cannot escape it and only
30 percent that luck, rather than effort or education, determines income.
Conversely, the data for Europe are 60 percent and 54 percent, respectively.
Ladd and Bowman (1998) show that in a similar way 60 percent of Amer-
icans versus 26 percent of Europeans are likely to think that the poor “are
lazy or lack willpower”and that 59 percent of Americans versus 34 percent
of Europeans are likely to think that “in the long run, hard work usually
brings a better life”. Suhrcke (2001) shows that large disparities in attitudes
also exist within Europe, especially between OECD and Eastern European
countries. It is also important to notice how the described beliefs appear
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FIGURE 1.1. Beliefs and Policies. Source: Alesina, Glaeser,
and Sacerdote (2001).
to be inaccurate and “ideological”: there is a significant discrepancy be-
tween the view of the American society as an exceptionally mobile one and
the actual evidence on intergenerational income or educational mobility.16
Such massive differences appear to be important, especially since there is
a strong correlation between these beliefs and the actual levels of redistri-
bution: see for example figure 1.1 reproduced from Alesina, Glaeser, and
Sacerdote (2001). There is also various evidence showing that beliefs are
strong determinants of the demand for redistribution and that individual
16As pointed out by Piketty (1998), the existing estimates of mobility suffer from method-
ological controversies. Nevertheless, existing studies show that for some European coun-
tries mobility is higher than in the US (see Bjorklund and Jantti (1997) on Scandinavian
countries and Couch and Dunn (1997) on Germany), for others it is similar (see Lefranc
and Trannoy (2004) on France) and for others it is lower (see Checchi, Ichino, and Rusti-
chini (1999) on Italy).
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beliefs determine individual political orientations more than other factors
like personal wealth.17
The theoretical contributions of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos
(2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) have developed insightful models
describing how individual beliefs can shape politico-economic outcomes
and viceversa and how multiple equilibria (US-type vs Europe-type) are
possible. All of those models start from the standard framework of Meltzer
and Richard (1981) and extend it. As in the model of Meltzer and Richard
(1981), agents vote for the level of redistribution before exerting effort and,
because of the moral hazard effect of redistribution, the optimal individual
effort decreases in the level of redistribution. For this reason, in the individ-
ual ideal level of redistribution the gains from redistribution are traded off
the moral hazard effect. As I have already discussed in the previous sub-
section, the standard Meltzer and Richard (1981) model has a unique equi-
librium where the greater is wealth inequality and the lower is the wealth
of the median voter with respect to the mean and consequently the higher
is the prevailing rate of redistribution. In order to introduce a role for be-
liefs and derive multiple equilibria these models introduce new elements.
In those models the technology is linear: y = θe + k, individual wealth y
is given by effort e times the return on effort θ plus a fixed endowment k
which does not depend on effort and – more importantly – that the indi-
vidual cannot influence. This is a very convenient formulation which can
17See for example Fong (2001), Corneo and Gruner (2002), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
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capture a number of ideas: the value of the return on effort θ represents
the extent to which hard work and other controllable factors contribute to
individual wealth, while the value of k represents the extent of the contri-
bution of factors outside individual control such as luck or the family of
origin. Incomplete information about the true value of θ versus k creates
the premise for different beliefs about the role of the two in the determi-
nation of wealth. Moreover a standard moral hazard effect implies that
the greater is the expected value of θ versus k and the greater is the effi-
ciency loss from redistribution, for this reason different beliefs may lead
to different prevailing redistribution rates in the political game. The paper
of Piketty (1995) is the first one to obtain multiple equilibria in this frame-
work with a dynamic model of imperfect learning. More specifically, in
the model of Piketty (1995) agents have incomplete information about the
true return on effort versus the role of predetermined factors and the ex-
perimentation of different levels of effort is costly. This implies that the
steady-state beliefs resulting from a bayesan learning process over an infi-
nite horizon do not necessarily have to be the correct ones. US- (Europe-)
type equilibria characterized by the widespread belief that effort plays a
major (minor) role and by low (high) redistribution are possible equilibria.
Link to some recent contributions in the behavioral economics literature,
the models of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006)
introduce different psychological elements in this framework. Alesina and
Angeletos (2005) model agents who have a concern for the fairness of the
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economic system, namely for the fact that people should get what they de-
serve and effort rather than luck should determine economic success. Also
in this model, agents have imperfect information about the true return on
effort versus the role of predetermined factors and this allows for different
beliefs. They discuss two equilibria of the model: in a US-type equilib-
rium agents believe that effort more than luck determines personal wealth,
consequently they vote for low redistribution, incentives are not distorted
and the belief is self sustained. Conversely, in the Europe-type equilibrium
agents believe that the economic system is not fair and factors as luck, birth,
connections, rather than effort, determine personal wealth, hence they vote
for high taxes, thus distorting allocations and making the beliefs to be self
sustained.18 Differently, in the work of Benabou and Tirole (2006) multiple
beliefs are possible because the agents find optimal to deliberately bias their
own perception of the truth so as to offset another bias which is procrastina-
tion. Also in this model agents have incomplete information about the true
return on effort versus the role of predetermined factors, but in addition to
this each agent receives a signal about the value of the return on effort θ.
The novel feature of the model is that each agent can decide the precision of
the signal, in other words each agent can decide how much to be informed
18Similarly to the paper of Alesina and Angeletos (2005), also in the recent work of Cervel-
lati, Esteban, and Kranich (2006) the individual preferred level of redistribution is not only
motivated by purely selfish concerns as in Meltzer and Richard (1981) but also by a so-
cial component; in this model, though, multiple equilibria do not originate from different
beliefs but from different moral sentiments.
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and manipulate her own (or her children’s in an intergenerational interpre-
tation) beliefs. Such formalization wants to capture the idea that (false) be-
liefs about the underlying determinants of wealth and social mobility could
derive from a false consciousness which is chosen and valued by the work-
ers themselves. Extensive evidence in sociology and psychology seems to
suggest this fact.19 Given time inconsistent preferences, which captures the
idea of procrastination and imperfect willpower, for each agent it is optimal
to have imperfect information so to think that the return on effort is greater
than the true value. This is because such belief increases the effort imple-
mented by the future self (using the language of behavioral economics, or
the future generation according to a more standard interpretation of the
model). Nevertheless, this bias has a cognitive cost and when people antici-
pate low redistribution the value of a proper motivation (in other words the
value of believing that θ is greater than the true value) is higher than with
higher redistribution. When redistribution is low (high) everyone thus has
greater incentives to believe that effort plays a major (minor) role and con-
sequently more voters finds optimal to hold to such a world-view.20 Due
to these complementarities between individuals ideological choices, there
can be two equilibria. A first, “American”equilibrium is characterized by a
high prevalence of the belief that θ is high and relatively low redistribution.
19See Benabou and Tirole (2006) for precise references.
20In the words of Benabou and Tirole (2006) this is the Belief in a JustWorld which captures
the idea of American exceptionalism versus a more European type of pessimistic belief.
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The other, “European”equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of
the belief that θ is low and relatively high redistribution.
1.2. The contribution of my thesis
In this thesis I present a new theoretical framework which shares some
of the underlying features of the last group ofmodels but, unlike those,allows
for varying degrees of incomplete information in the economy and focuses
on the effect that incomplete information has on the political and economic
outcomes. As I have already explained in the previous section, incomplete
information is a common element in the models of Piketty (1995), Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006), but it is the addition
of other elements on top of that to imply the existence of multiple equi-
libria in these models. I have already discussed that those additional ele-
ments are imperfect learning in Piketty (1995) and psychological elements
as preferences for social fairness in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) or as time
inconsistent preferences and cognitive dissonance in Benabou and Tirole
(2006). Nevertheless, the degree of underlying incomplete information in
those models is fixed, in other words a government or another institution
could not do anything in order to increase the agents’ information about
the value of θ versus k. In reality it appears to be the case that there are
ways in which institutions can influence agents’ information about the un-
derlying determinants of wealth and mobility. For example, the type of
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education can have an impact on the degree of information because the re-
turn on effort θ depends on individual ability and an educational system
which reveals individual abilities better can be a way to make individual
beliefs to be more realistic. Another way for an institution to provide more
information could be to provide accurate historical data on the dynamics of
mobility. Or again the information of the agents can be influenced by pro-
paganda: a government or a group of people could try to convince others
about the importance of effort versus predetermined factors. It is useful to
precise that the contribution is not to build a detailed analysis of endoge-
nous propaganda or educational features.21 It is instead a more abstract
exercise which, assuming that there is an institution which can influence
the degree of information as indeed seems to be the case, considers the
degree of information as a policy variable and answers to a natural policy
questions: What is the effect of varying degree of information on individual
choices and aggregate outcomes? What is the optimal level of information
given different objectives?
I develop a model which extensively builds extensively on the frame-
work which is shared by the models of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angele-
tos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) that I presented in the previous
section. The technology is the same linear one that I have described, agents
21Nevertheless I will also offer some predictions at this level which are interestingly in line
with some existing empirical and anecdotal evidence.
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still have incomplete information about the true value of the return on ef-
fort and with such incomplete information they first vote over redistribu-
tion and then exert effort. The novel feature is represented by allowing for
varying degrees of incomplete of information and consequently derive the
comparative statics of the individual and aggregate political and economic
outcomes. In order to allow for varying degrees of incomplete information
I introduce a modification of the informative set-up of Benabou and Tirole
(2006). The economic agents in mymodel do not know the true value of the
individual return on effort on ability but receive informative signals about
this individual value. The precision of the signals is the same across agents
and this feature wants to capture the idea that the level of information is an
institutional feature of the economy.22 Varying the precision of the signal
means to vary the degree of information in the economy. This framework
isolates the effect of incomplete information, as other elements23 are not
present in the model and allows a clear analysis of a number of interesting
comparative statics. The degree of information impacts on two individual
choices: the decision about voting over redistribution and the choice of ef-
fort. Increasing the level of information improves the individual choices of
effort. For this reason, net of the effect that information has on the voted
rate of redistribution, increasing the level of information improves ex-ante
22Of course it would be realistic and interesting to allow for the possibility of different pre-
cisions across groups of agents or networks and I leave this exercise to the future research.
23For example there are not the psychological elements which were present in the models
of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006).
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welfare. Conversely, increasing the level of information can increase or de-
crease the prevailing rate of redistribution depending on the identity of the
median voter. The most interesting case is when increasing the level of in-
formation increases the prevailing rate of redistribution. In such case, in a
model with linear utility in wealth and therefore where the ex-ante optimal
rate of redistribution is equal to zero, increasing the level of information
has a trade-off effect: on one hand it improves the allocation of individual
effort but on the other hand it raises inefficient redistributive taxation. This
is the first important result of my analysis, namely that welfare does not
increase monotonically in information.24 A second important result is to
show that generally the welfare function can be both concave and convex
in the level of information. The reason for this is essentially that, net of the
effect of the redistributive tax, the welfare function is convex in the level
of information. This result links back to the seminal contribution of Rad-
ner and Stiglitz (1984) who show the convexity of the value of information.
The convexity of the welfare function implies that there are cases of multi-
ple optimal levels of information. Considering the level of information as
a policy variable, the comparative statics of varying levels of information
can address interesting policy questions. In addition to the comparative
statics which relate to welfare, I analyze the comparative statics of all the
other political and economic outcomes: prevailing rate of redistribution, in-
dividual and aggregate effort and output. A third important result relates
24This result is not entirely dependent on the assumption of linear utility function as I will
discuss in chapter 2
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to the comparative statics of aggregate output. I show that also aggregate
output is not monotonic in the level of information and can also be both
concave and convex; nevertheless, in the case in which the prevailing rate
of redistribution increases in the level of information I show that output is
maximized for the minimum level of information.
Up to this point I have described comparative statics results which are
obtained varying the level of information exogenously. The second step of
my analysis is to consider an endogenous prevailing level of information. I
model it as the result of a collective choice. In the case in which every agent
is identical before receiving the informative signal about individual ability,
all agents agree on the same ex-ante optimal level of information which also
maximizes ex-ante welfare. Fixed the level of information as the ex-ante
welfare maximizing, I define a politico-economic equilibrium as the result-
ing beliefs, prevailing level of redistribution and optimal individual choices
of effort. Given multiple optimal values of information, there are multi-
ple politico-economic equilibria which can still be interpreted as US-type
versus Europe-type. The two equilibria still present the known macroeco-
nomic features found by the previous literature, namely that the US-type
(Europe-type) politico-economic equilibrium is characterized by relatively
low (high) redistribution and high (low) aggregate output. What is new in
my model is a characterization of the two equilibria in terms of the infor-
mative features. I find a US- (Europe-) type politico-economic equilibrium
to be characterized by relatively (i) low (high) informative signals and high
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(low) adverse selection, as individual beliefs and effort levels are pooled
(separated) (ii) low (high) moral hazard, as redistribution is low (high) and
hence does not (does) distort individual effort to a great extent.
With respect to the existence of multiple politico-economic equilibria,
my thesis presents a methodological contribution as it shows that multiple
equilibria can be obtained without psychological biases. The contribution
in terms of interpretations is to open a door to the role played by possibly
different information “cultures”. Some empirical evidence in the literature
in education goes supports the predictions of mymodel. For example, there
is quite a large strand of literature showing how the American secondary
schooling system is less informative than the European about the position
of a student in the national distribution of abilities.25 Another point in sup-
port the predictions of the two equilibria comes from the features of the
American dream type of belief. If according to this belief “everybody has a
chance to become rich”26, then it means that in such a society people do not
perceive that differences in the individual return of effort can be too large.
In our model the American-type of equilibrium has precisely this feature
that people pool to similar beliefs about the value of the return on effort.
Moreover, showing the existence of multiple optimal informative cultures,
my analysis can offer new insights with respect to the “Neo-Marxist”type
of explanation which is more common in the literature in political science.
25John H. Bishop is a leading scholar in this field, among many works on the topic I refer
the interested economists to Bishop (1996) which focus on signalling and Bishop (1997).
26As it appears from various already cited evidence about social beliefs.
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A more modern and more symmetric version of this view can be found
in the work of Alesina and Glaeser (2004). The authors argue that just as
American beliefs result from indoctrination predominantly controlled by
the wealthier classes, European beliefs result from indoctrination predom-
inantly controlled by Marxist-influenced intellectuals. Alesina and Glaeser
(2004) claim that the process of indoctrination has been achieved through
the choice of specific institutions and political systems. For example they
show how, in the American political history, factors like federalism, ma-
jority representation and segregation worked towards low cross-ethnic co-
hesion and the already described beliefs. My analysis shows how certain
beliefs can be imposed in a society not only through the choice of the type
of institutions but also through the choice of a certain informative struc-
ture. More importantly, my analysis shows that the prevailing informative
structure can be actually maintained by the society as an autonomous col-
lective choice and not only as the result of a process of indoctrination. This
possibility is shown in my model by the result that, behind the veil of igno-
rance, societies with similar fundamentals, but with different informative
structures, can find optimal to maintain such differences. This idea can be
further supported by the different historical experiences of the US versus
Europe, as it appears that the two societies started their modern histories
with different informative structures. Moreover, the interpretation of the
two societies as characterized by different political and economic outcomes
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and at the same time by similar levels of welfare seems particularly ap-
pealing when we thinking about anecdotal evidence. A deeper analysis of
the interpretation of my results in relation to the educational and the insti-
tutional features of the two societies goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless it could be a fertile ground for future research.
The remaining of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents
themainmodel, the alreadymentioned results plus other extensions. Chap-
ter 3 develops an intergenerational dynamic model with the same informa-
tion set up as the model of chapter 2 and takes a first step towards the
development of a unifying framework which can allow to study how be-
liefs about the determinants of wealth can affect the dynamics of inequality,
mobility and redistribution. It follows a short conclusion that summarizes
the main results and gives some directions for future research. Most of the
proofs follow directly the propositions, but two longer proofs are organized
in appendix A. Appendix B contains a paper which tackles a completely
different theoretical problem of competitive equilibria existence on which
I worked in the first phase of my PhD. It is a self contained contribution
and has no relation with the rest of the thesis. I aimed to organize the vari-
ous chapters as much as possible as autonomous articles to be submitted to
peer-reviewed journals27, nevertheless I provide cross references between
the various chapters when useful.
27For this reason the reader will notice some repetitions across different chapters.
CHAPTER 2
A simple model of Beliefs and Redistributive Politics under
Optimally Incomplete Information
2.1. Introduction
The reason behind the observed wide differences in the social contract
across similarly developed countries represents a challenging questionwhich
has motivated a large body of research across disciplines. The most evi-
dent example of such differences is represented by the persistence of West-
ern European-type welfare states versus US-type more laissez-faire social
contracts. Pre-tax inequality is higher in the United States than in West-
ern European countries (“Europe”in short), nevertheless it is Europe to be
characterized by more extensive redistributive policies.1 Without denying
the importance of some “fundamental”differences across countries which
can impact on such redistributive outcomes, various economists looked for
explanations of such societal choices without appealing to exogenous dif-
ferences in tastes, technologies or political systems. Under this perspective,
1Alesina and Angeletos (2005) report that while the Gini coefficient in the pre-tax income
distribution in the United States is 38.5 against 29.1 in Europe, the income tax structure
is more progressive in Europe, the overall size of government is about 50 per cent larger
in Europe than in the United States (about 30 versus about 45 per cent of GDP) and the
largest difference is represented by transfers and other social benefits, where Europeans
spend about twice asmuch as Americans. More extensive and detailed evidence about this
can be found in Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004).
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redistributive outcomes are not considered as exogenous but are endoge-
nously determined taking the political process into account.
The seminal paper ofMeltzer and Richard (1981) develops the first model
in which the prevailing rate of redistribution in an economy is determined
endogenously through the median voter theorem. An influential strand of
literature which started in the 90’s has developed models of inequality, re-
distribution and growth building on the framework of Meltzer and Richard
(1981). The basic prediction of the framework of Meltzer and Richard (1981)
is that of a unique equilibrium rate of redistribution, where greater inequal-
ity translates into a poorer median voter relative to the country’s mean in-
come and therefore the greater the inequality and the higher it is the pre-
vailing (or equilibrium) rate of redistribution in the economy. The observa-
tion that, especially across developed countries, higher pre-tax inequality
does not seem to imply higher redistribution is therefore inconsistent with
the predictions of the theory of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and of the fol-
lowing models.2
2Perotti (1994), Perotti (1996) and most of the other studies reviewed in Benabou (1996c)
find no relationship between inequality and the share of government expenditures in GDP.
Among advanced countries the effect is actually negative. This is suggested by many
examples as the already cited differences between Western Europe and the United States.
The observation holds within Wester Europe itself, where Scandinavian countries are both
the most equal and the most redistributive. Using panel data for 20 OECD countries,
Rodriguez (1998) finds that pre-tax inequality has a significative negative effect on every
major category of social transfers as a fraction of GDP, as well as on the capital tax rate.
The seminal contributions which introduced the framework of Meltzer and Richard (1981)
in dynamic models of growth are those of Perotti (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and
Persson and Tabellini (1994); like Meltzer and Richard (1981), all those models obtain the
result that higher inequality translates into higher redistribution.
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Despite the existence of solid alternative theoretical explanations 3, the
observed differences in the political support for redistribution appear to re-
flect the differences in the beliefs which different societies hold about the
underlying determinants of individual wealth and the extent of social mo-
bility. Not only notable differences exist in the level of redistribution (or
social contract) across countries, striking differences appear in the beliefs
that different societies hold about the underlying determinants of individ-
ual fortunes and poverty and such beliefs appear to be determinant for the
observed social contracts. Once again the most striking difference relates
to the differences between the United States and Western Europe. Since
De Tocqueville (1835), many have noticed the exceptionalism or dream char-
acterizing the American society, in other words the widespread belief ac-
cording to which everyone can become rich if wants so andmobility is high
in the “land of opportunities”.4 De Tocqueville (1835) himself and many
3Departing from the basic Meltzer and Richard (1981) framework but still considering the
level of redistribution as endogenously determined, the theories of Benabou (2000), Ben-
abou (2005), Saint-Paul (2001), Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003)
have been able to show how both European-type welfare states and US-type laissez-faire
societies, together with respectively lower and higher levels of inequality, can arise as mul-
tiple steady states from the joint dynamics of the wealth distribution and redistributive
policies.
4Recent data from the World Values Survey reported by Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote
(2001) and Keely (2002) show that only 29 percent of Americans believe that the poor are
trapped in poverty and cannot escape it and only 30 percent that luck, rather than effort
or education, determines income. Conversely, the data for Europe are 60 percent and 54
percent, respectively. Ladd and Bowman (1998) show that in a similar way 60 percent of
Americans versus 26 percent of Europeans are likely to think that the poor “are lazy or lack
willpower”and that 59 percent of Americans versus 34 percent of Europeans are likely to
think that “in the long run, hard work usually brings a better life”. Suhrcke (2001) shows
that large disparities in attitudes also exist within Europe, especially between OECD and
Eastern European countries.
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other sociologists and political scientists after him5 have pointed to persis-
tent differences in the popular beliefs about social mobility in explaining
the persistent differences between US and European redistributive politics.
Those observed massive differences in the beliefs appear to be important,
especially since there is a strong correlation between these beliefs and the
actual levels of redistribution and there is also empirical evidence about the
fact that beliefs are actually strong determinants of the demand for redis-
tribution.6
The theoretical contributions of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos
(2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) have developed insightful theoreti-
cal models describing how individual beliefs can shape politico-economic
outcomes and viceversa and how multiple equilibria (US-type vs Europe-
type) with different beliefs are possible. All of those models start from the
standard framework of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and extend it. As in
the model of Meltzer and Richard (1981), agents vote for the level of re-
distribution before exerting effort and, because of the typical moral hazard
of redistribution, the optimal individual effort decreases in the level of re-
distribution; for this reason in the individual choice of the ideal level of
redistribution the gains from redistribution are traded off the moral hazard
effect of redistribution. As I have already discussed, the standard Meltzer
5For example Lipset wrote extensively about it.
6See Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) about the cross correlation between the belief
that “luck determines wealth”and the level of redistribution. See Fong (2001), Corneo and
Gruner (2002), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) about the evidence showing that beliefs are
strong determinants of the demand for redistribution and that individual beliefs determine
individual political orientations more than other factors like personal wealth.
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and Richard (1981) model has a unique equilibrium where the greater is
the inequality and the lower is the wealth of the median voter with respect
to the mean and consequently the higher is the prevailing rate of redistri-
bution. In order to introduce a role for beliefs and derive multiple equilib-
ria these models introduce new elements. One common feature is that the
economic agents described by these models have incomplete information
about the determinants of individual wealth, namely about the value of the
return on effort versus the value of the predetermined factors on which the
individual has no control. It is this incomplete information to create the
premise for different beliefs about the role of controllable (as hard work
and discipline) vs. uncontrollable (as luck or family of origin) factors in the
determination of wealth. Moreover a standard moral hazard effect implies
that the greater is the expected value of the return on effort and the greater
is the efficiency loss from redistribution, for this reason different beliefs
may lead to different prevailing redistribution rates in the political game.
The paper of Piketty (1995) is the first one to obtain multiple equilibria in
this framework with a dynamic model of imperfect learning. More specif-
ically, in the model of Piketty (1995) agents have incomplete information
about the true return on effort versus the role of predetermined factors and
the experimentation of different levels of effort is costly. This implies that
the steady-state beliefs resulting from a bayesan learning process over an
infinite horizon do not necessarily have to be the correct ones. US- (Europe-
) type equilibria characterized by the widespread belief that effort plays a
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major (minor) role and by low (high) redistribution are possible equilibria.
Making a link to some recent literature in behavioral economics, the models
of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) introduce
different psychological elements in this framework. Alesina and Angeletos
(2005) model agents who have a concern for the fairness of the economic
system, namely for the fact that people should get what they deserve and
effort rather than luck should determine economic success. Also in this
model, agents have imperfect information about the true return on effort
versus the role of predetermined factors and this allows for different be-
liefs. The authors discuss two equilibria of the model: in a US-type equilib-
rium agents believe that effort more than luck determines personal wealth,
consequently they vote for low redistribution, incentives are not distorted
and the belief is self sustained. Conversely, in the Europe-type equilibrium
agents believe that the economic system is not fair and factors as luck, birth,
connections, rather than effort, determine personal wealth, hence they vote
for high taxes, thus distorting allocations and making the beliefs to be self
sustained. 7 Differently, in the work of Benabou and Tirole (2006) multiple
beliefs are possible because the agents find optimal to deliberately bias their
own perception of the truth so as to offset another bias which is procrastina-
tion. Also in this model agents have incomplete information about the true
return on effort versus the role of predetermined factors, but in addition to
7Similarly to the paper of Alesina and Angeletos (2005), also in the recent work of Cervel-
lati, Esteban, and Kranich (2006) the individual preferred level of redistribution is not
motivated by purely selfish concerns as in Meltzer and Richard (1981) but also by a so-
cial component; in this model, though, multiple equilibria do not originate from different
beliefs but from different moral sentiments.
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this each agent receives a signal about the value of the return on effort. The
novel feature of the model is that each agent can decide the precision of the
signal, in other words each agent can decide howmuch to be informed and
manipulate her own (or her children’s) beliefs. Such formalization wants
to capture the idea that (false) beliefs about the underlying determinants of
wealth and social mobility could derive from a false consciousness which
is chosen and valued by the worker themselves. Extensive evidence in so-
ciology and psychology seems to suggest this fact.8. Given time inconsis-
tent preferences, which captures the idea of procrastination and imperfect
willpower, for each agent it is optimal to have imperfect information so to
think that the return on effort is greater than the true value. This is because
such belief increases the effort implemented by the future self (using the
language of behavioral economics, or the future generation according to a
more standard interpretation of the model). Nevertheless this bias has a
cognitive cost and when people anticipate little redistribution the value of
a proper motivation (in other words the value of believing that the return
on effort is greater than the true value) is much higher than with higher
redistribution. When redistribution is low everyone thus has greater incen-
tives to believe that effort plays a major role9 and consequently more voters
finds optimal to hold to such a world-view. Due to these complementari-
ties between individuals ideological choices, there can be two equilibria. A
8See Benabou and Tirole (2006) for precise references.
9In the words of Benabou and Tirole (2006) this is the Belief in a Just World which captures
the idea of American exceptionalism
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first, “American”equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of the
belief that the return on effort is high and relatively low redistribution. The
other, “European”equilibrium is characterized by a high prevalence of the
belief that the return on effort is low and relatively high redistribution.
The contribution of this chapter.
In this chapter I present a new theoretical framework which shares some of
the underlying features of the last group of models but, unlike those,allows
for varying degrees of incomplete information in the economy and focuses
on the effect that incomplete information has on the political and economic
outcomes. As I have already explained in the previous section, incomplete
information is a common element in the models of Piketty (1995), Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006), but it is the addition
of other elements on top of that to imply the existence of multiple equi-
libria in these models. I have already discussed that those additional ele-
ments are imperfect learning in Piketty (1995) and psychological elements
as preferences for social fairness in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) or as time
inconsistent preferences and cognitive dissonance in Benabou and Tirole
(2006). Nevertheless, the degree of underlying incomplete information in
those models is fixed, in other words a government or another institution
could not do anything in order to increase the agents’ information about
the value of θ versus k. In reality it appears to be the case that there are
ways in which institutions can influence agents’ information about the un-
derlying determinants of wealth and mobility. For example, the type of
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education can have an impact on the degree of information because the re-
turn on effort θ depends on individual ability and an educational system
which reveals individual abilities better can be a way to make individual
beliefs to be more realistic. Another way for an institution to provide more
information could be to provide accurate historical data on the dynamics of
mobility. Or again the information of the agents can be influenced by pro-
paganda: a government or a group of people could try to convince others
about the importance of effort versus predetermined factors. It is useful to
precise that the contribution is not to build a detailed analysis of endoge-
nous propaganda or educational features.10 It is instead a more abstract
exercise which, assuming that there is an institution which can influence
the degree of information as indeed seems to be the case, considers the
degree of information as a policy variable and answers to a natural policy
questions: What is the effect of varying degree of information on individual
choices and aggregate outcomes? What is the optimal level of information
given different objectives?
I develop a model which extensively builds extensively on the frame-
work which is shared by the models of Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angele-
tos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) that I presented in the previous
section. The technology is the same linear one that I have described, agents
10Nevertheless I will also offer some predictions at this level which are interestingly in line
with some existing empirical and anecdotal evidence.
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still have incomplete information about the true value of the return on ef-
fort and with such incomplete information they first vote over redistribu-
tion and then exert effort. The novel feature is represented by allowing for
varying degrees of incomplete of information and consequently derive the
comparative statics of the individual and aggregate political and economic
outcomes. In order to allow for varying degrees of incomplete information
I introduce a modification of the informative set-up of Benabou and Tirole
(2006). The economic agents in mymodel do not know the true value of the
individual return on effort on ability but receive informative signals about
this individual value. The precision of the signals is the same across agents
and this feature wants to capture the idea that the level of information is an
institutional feature of the economy.11 Varying the precision of the signal
means to vary the degree of information in the economy. This framework
isolates the effect of incomplete information, as other elements12 are not
present in the model and allows a clear analysis of a number of interesting
comparative statics. The degree of information impacts on two individual
choices: the decision about voting over redistribution and the choice of ef-
fort. Increasing the level of information improves the individual choices of
effort. For this reason, net of the effect that information has on the voted
rate of redistribution, increasing the level of information improves ex-ante
11Of course it would be realistic and interesting to allow for the possibility of different pre-
cisions across groups of agents or networks and I leave this exercise to the future research.
12For example there are not the psychological elements which were present in the models
of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006).
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welfare. Conversely, increasing the level of information can increase or de-
crease the prevailing rate of redistribution depending on the identity of the
median voter. The most interesting case is when increasing the level of in-
formation increases the prevailing rate of redistribution. In such case, in a
model with linear utility in wealth and therefore where the ex-ante optimal
rate of redistribution is equal to zero, increasing the level of information
has a trade-off effect: on one hand it improves the allocation of individual
effort but on the other hand it raises inefficient redistributive taxation. This
is the first important result of my analysis, namely that welfare does not
increase monotonically in information.13 A second important result is to
show that generally the welfare function can be both concave and convex
in the level of information. The reason for this is essentially that, net of the
effect of the redistributive tax, the welfare function is convex in the level
of information. This result links back to the seminal contribution of Rad-
ner and Stiglitz (1984) who show the convexity of the value of information.
The convexity of the welfare function implies that there are cases of multi-
ple optimal levels of information. Considering the level of information as
a policy variable, the comparative statics of varying levels of information
can address interesting policy questions. In addition to the comparative
statics which relate to welfare, I analyze the comparative statics of all the
other political and economic outcomes: prevailing rate of redistribution, in-
dividual and aggregate effort and output. A third important result relates
13This result is not entirely dependent on the assumption of linear utility function as I will
discuss in chapter 2
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to the comparative statics of aggregate output. I show that also aggregate
output is not monotonic in the level of information and can also be both
concave and convex; nevertheless, in the case in which the prevailing rate
of redistribution increases in the level of information I show that output is
maximized for the minimum level of information.
Up to this point I have described comparative statics results which are
obtained varying the level of information exogenously. The second step of
my analysis is to consider an endogenous prevailing level of information. I
model it as the result of a collective choice. In the case in which every agent
is identical before receiving the informative signal about individual ability,
all agents agree on the same ex-ante optimal level of information which also
maximizes ex-ante welfare. Fixed the level of information as the ex-ante
welfare maximizing, I define a politico-economic equilibrium as the result-
ing beliefs, prevailing level of redistribution and optimal individual choices
of effort. Given multiple optimal values of information, there are multi-
ple politico-economic equilibria which can still be interpreted as US-type
versus Europe-type. The two equilibria still present the known macroeco-
nomic features found by the previous literature, namely that the US-type
(Europe-type) politico-economic equilibrium is characterized by relatively
low (high) redistribution and high (low) aggregate output. What is new in
my model is a characterization of the two equilibria in terms of the infor-
mative features. I find a US- (Europe-) type politico-economic equilibrium
to be characterized by relatively (i) low (high) informative signals and high
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(low) adverse selection, as individual beliefs and effort levels are pooled
(separated) (ii) low (high) moral hazard, as redistribution is low (high) and
hence does not (does) distort individual effort to a great extent.
With respect to the existence of multiple politico-economic equilibria,
my thesis presents a methodological contribution as it shows that multiple
equilibria can be obtained without psychological biases. The contribution
in terms of interpretations is to open a door to the role played by possibly
different information “cultures”. Some empirical evidence in the literature
in education goes supports the predictions of mymodel. For example, there
is quite a large strand of literature showing how the American secondary
schooling system is less informative than the European about the position
of a student in the national distribution of abilities.14 Another point in sup-
port the predictions of the two equilibria comes from the features of the
American dream type of belief. If according to this belief “everybody has a
chance to become rich”15, then it means that in such a society people do not
perceive that differences in the individual return of effort can be too large.
In our model the American-type of equilibrium has precisely this feature
that people pool to similar beliefs about the value of the return on effort.
Moreover, showing the existence of multiple optimal informative cultures,
my analysis can offer new insights with respect to the “Neo-Marxist”type
of explanation which is more common in the literature in political science.
14John H. Bishop is a leading scholar in this field, among many works in the topic I refer
the interested economists to Bishop (1996), Bishop (1997) and relative references.
15As it appears from various already cited evidence about social beliefs.
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A more modern and more symmetric version of this view can be found
in the work of Alesina and Glaeser (2004). The authors argue that just as
American beliefs result from indoctrination predominantly controlled by
the wealthier classes, European beliefs result from indoctrination predom-
inantly controlled by Marxist-influenced intellectuals. Alesina and Glaeser
(2004) claim that the process of indoctrination has been achieved through
the choice of specific institutions and political systems. For example they
show how, in the American political history, factors like federalism, ma-
jority representation and segregation worked towards low cross-ethnic co-
hesion and the already described beliefs. My analysis shows how certain
beliefs can be imposed in a society not only through the choice of the type
of institutions but also through the choice of a certain informative struc-
ture. More importantly, my analysis shows that the prevailing informative
structure can be actually maintained by the society as an autonomous col-
lective choice and not only as the result of a process of indoctrination. This
possibility is shown in my model by the result that, behind the veil of igno-
rance, societies with similar fundamentals, but with different informative
structures, can find optimal to maintain such differences. This idea can be
further supported by the different historical experiences of the US versus
Europe, as it appears that the two societies started their modern histories
with different informative structures. Moreover, the interpretation of the
two societies as characterized by different political and economic outcomes
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and at the same time by similar levels of welfare seems particularly ap-
pealing when we thinking about anecdotal evidence. A deeper analysis of
the interpretation of my results in relation to the educational and the insti-
tutional features of the two societies goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless it could be a fertile ground for future research.
The present chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
set-up of the model. Section 2.3 analyzes the voting problem and the rela-
tive outcome. Section 2.4 analyzes the comparative statics considering the
precision of the signal as an exogenous policy variable. In section 2.5 I
analyze the optimal ex-ante precision for the economy. In section 2.6 I in-
troduce the concept of politico-economic equilibrium and investigate the
possibility of existence of multiple equilibria. Section 2.7 analyzes the ro-
bustness and the generalization of the results. Sections 2.8 and 2.9 respec-
tively introduce heterogenous endowments and risk aversion in the main
model as a robustness check. Section 2.10 concludes.
2.2. Set Up
I Consider an economy populated by a continuum of agents i ∈ [0, 1].
Each individual i produces a quantity yi of output with the following tech-
nology:
(2.1) yi = ki + θiei,
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where ki is an observable endowment of resources, ei is the effort imple-
mented by agent i and θi is the return to effort or productivity. In this basic
version of the model I assume that the endowment is homogeneous across
agents, i.e. ki = k for all i 16, but I will later consider the possibility of het-
erogeneous endowments. I assume that θi is i.i.d. across agents and that
θi takes value θL for a fraction π of the population and value θH for the re-
maining fraction 1−π, with θL < θH . Agents have incomplete information:
each agent i cannot observe her own or other agents’ productivity but only
receives a private signal σi about the true value of θi. Also the signal σi
is binary. If θi = θL (θ
i = θH), σ
i takes values σL (σH ) or σH (σL), respec-
tively with probability λ and 1 − λ. In other words for each agent i the
signal σi is independently distributed, it is truthful with probability λ, false
with probability 1 − λ and the transition matrix which takes from the true
productivity to the signal is the following:
(2.2) T




σL
σH


∣∣∣ [θL, θH ]

 =


λ 1− λ
1− λ λ

 .
The structure of the economy – including the value of π andmatrix (2.2) – is
common knowledge, the only incomplete information is about the true val-
ues of the θ’s. Agents are fully rational and agent’s i belief of the true value
of θi, conditional on the observation of the private signal σi, is obtained by
16It will be clear that an homogeneous endowment does not play any role and without loss
of generality I could set k = 0.
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the Bayes Rule. I introduce the following notation:
(2.3) µi ≡ Pr[θi = θL|σi],
represents agent i belief that θi = θL conditional on the observation of signal
σi. From the Bayes rule it follows that:
(2.4) µσL ≡ (µi|σi = σL) =
πλ
πλ+ (1− π)(1− λ)
and
(2.5) µσH ≡ (µi|σi = σH) =
π(1− λ)
π(1− λ) + λ(1− π) .
The expected value of θi conditional on the observation of σi is given by the
following expression:
(2.6) θ(µi) ≡ µiθL + (1− µi)θH .
Given the symmetric structure of (2.2) I consider the interval λ ∈ [1/2, 1].
For λ = 1/2 the signal σi is completely uninformative and the posterior
belief is equal to the prior, i.e. µσL=µσH=π. Increasing λ makes the signal
progressively more informative up to the point that λ = 1 and the signal
is perfectly informative, i.e. µσL = 1, µσH = 0.
17 As already explained
17I could have alternatively considered the interval λ ∈ [0, 1/2], in this case λ = 0 implies
that the signal is perfectly informative and increasing λ up to λ = 1/2 makes the signal
progressively less informative. It will be clear that given the symmetric structure of the
signal the entire analysis would be symmetric to the one obtained considering λ ∈ [1/2, 1].
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in the introduction, the value of λ represents the level of information in the
economy and in a rather abstract way I consider it is an institutional feature
and a policy variable. The ex-ante probability of observing σL is given by
the following expression:
(2.7) pσL ≡ Pr[σi = σL] = λπ + (1− λ)(1− π),
symmetrically
(2.8) pσH ≡ Pr[σi = σH ] = λ(1− π) + π(1− λ) = 1− pσL .
Over-lined variables stand for mean values for the population, hence y¯ and
e¯ are respectively the mean, or aggregate, values of output and effort and
θ ≡ πθL + (1− π)θH ,
θ2 ≡ πθ2L + (1− π)θ2H ,
are respectively the mean values of productivity and squared productivity.
Agents face a linear income tax/redistribution scheme which implies the
following expression for individual consumption:
(2.9) ci = (1− τ)yi + τ y¯,
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where τ is the tax rate which prevails in the political game with majority
voting. Such linear redistribution scheme is due to Romer (1975), it is stan-
dard in this literature and implies that the government budget constraint is
always binding. Throughout the analysis I consider the following individ-
ual utility function18:
(2.10) ui(ci, ei) = ci − a
2
(ei)2.
I consider three periods t = {0, 1, 2} and the following timing. In period
0 each agent only knows the values π, λ and the structure of the game. In
period 1 each agent i receives the private signal σi, then votes over the tax
rate τ and once that the prevailing tax rate is revealed, each agent i chooses
the effort level ei. In the final period individual income yi is realized, agents
get the net outcome of the production activity plus a net transfer and enjoy
consumption19.
2.3. Voters’ Problem
Plugging expressions (2.1) and (2.9) into (2.10) I obtain the expression of
the expected utility of agent i at t:
(2.11) uit = E[(1− τ)(k + eiθi) + τ(k + eθ)− a(ei)2/2|I it ],
18In section 2.9 I will consider the possibility of concavity in consumption and discuss the
relative implications.
19Therefore in the final period the uncertainty regarding the value of θi is resolved as
agents can infer the true value of θi from yi.
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where E[·|I it ] is individual i’s expectation conditional on the information
at time t. As explained in the previous section, the information structure
is such that I i0 = T and I
i
1 = (T, σ
i). Given that voting and effort choices
take place at t = 1, after that the signal σi is received, what is important to
bear inmind is that the objective function that each agent imaximizeswhen
voting and choosing effort is the expected utility (2.11) conditional on signal
σi. Solving backwards, each individual imaximizes (2.11) choosing ei after
that the winning tax rate τ is announced. Being (2.11) strictly concave in ei,
by solving the sufficient first order condition I find the optimal individual
level of effort:
(2.12) ei = (1− τ)θ(µi)/a.
By backward induction, I can plug (2.12) into (2.11) and find the objective
function that i maximizes when voting for the tax rate. In order to do this,
it is useful to specify the individual i expectation of the output from effort:
(2.13) E[eiθi|I i1] = (1− τ)
(
θ(µi)
)2
/a
and of squared effort
(2.14) E[(ei)2|I i1] = (ei)2 =
(
1− τ
a
)2
θ(µi)2.
In computing the mean (aggregate) product of effort eθ, each agent i knows
that that a fraction π (1−π) of the agents have productivity θL (θH ) and that
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among those a fraction λ chooses the optimal effort after the observation
of σL (σH ), whereas a fraction 1 − λ chooses the optimal effort after the
observation of σH (σL). Therefore it is the case that
(2.15) E[eθ|I i1] = (1− τ)Γ/a,
where I define
(2.16) Γ ≡ πθL (λθ(µσL) + (1− λ)θ(µσH ))+
(1− π)θH ((1− λ)θ(µσL) + λθ(µσH )) .
Collecting θ(µσL) and θ(µσH ) it is easy to re-write expression (2.16) as
(2.17) Γ = pσLθ(µσL)
2 + (1− pσL)θ(µσH )2.
The term Γ is the expression for aggregate output from effort, net of the
distortive effect of redistribution on effort. It will be shown that this term
will play a crucial role in the analysis. Plugging (2.13), (2.14) and (2.16) into
(2.11), I obtain an indirect form of (2.11) as a function of τ :
(2.18) ui1 = k
i + (1− τ)2θ(µi)2/a+ τ(1− τ)Γ/a− (1− τ)2θ(µi)2/2a.
This is the object that voter i maximizes voting over the tax rate τ . As-
suming for the moment that the second derivative of the objective function
(2.18) is strictly negative, the ideal tax rate of agent i follows from the first
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order condition:
(2.19) τ(µi) = 1− 1
2− θ(µi)2
Γ
.
The denominator of (2.19) shows how the subjective prospects of upward
mobility reduce the desired tax rate.20 I introduce an assumption which
bounds above the heterogeneity in individual abilities in order to assure
the concavity of the objective function (2.18) and thus to use the median
voter theorem.
Assumption 2.1: 2θ2L > θ
2
H .
A proposition follows:
PROPOSITION 2.1. Individual preferences for the rate of redistribution are
single peaked and the individual ideal rate of redistribution is given by expression
(2.19).
PROOF. The second derivative of the objective function in problem (2.18)
is given by the following expression:
d2ui1
dτ
=
−2Γ + θ(µi)2
a
.
20The concept of prospects of upward mobility and its role in the determination of the
prevailing rate of redistribution is the focus of the analysis of Benabou and Ok (2001). The
term θ(µ
i)2
Γ represents the subjective prospects of upward mobility as it is equal to the the
ratio of individual output (2.13) over aggregate output (2.15), noticing that the term 1−τ
a
gets canceled out.
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The condition stated by Assumption 2.1 is sufficient for (2.20) to be strictly
negative as the maximum value that θ(µ)2 can take is θ2H and the minimum
value that 2Γ can take is 2θ2L. 
Proposition 3.2 shows that preferences over the tax rate are single peaked
and therefore the median voter theorem applies. Labeling the prevailing
tax rate in the voting game as τ , I analyze the political outcome. There are
two groups of voters in the economy: those who observe σL and those who
observe σH , respectively with preferred tax rates τ(µσL) and τ(µσH ). Given
the majority voting rule, if pσL > (<) 1/2, then τ = τ(µσL) (τ = τ(µσH )) is
the prevailing tax rate in the economy.21
2.4. Comparative Statics
I analyze the effect of a change in the value of the level of information
λ on the endogenous variables of the model: prevailing tax rate, individ-
ual and aggregate effort, aggregate output. As already explained in the
introduction, this is a natural exercise in order to understand the effects of
policies which change – directly or indirectly – the level of information in
an economy, for example policies based on education or policies based on
propaganda. In the following two lemmas I present two important interme-
diate results which are fundamental for the full analysis of the comparative
statics.
21Obviously when pσL = 1/2 the majority group is undetermined. Notice also that if
λ = 1/2 the signal is uninformative and µσL = µσH = pi (namely the prior is equal to the
posterior) and every agent i prefers the same tax rate τ(µi), where µi = pi. From (2.19) it
is easy to notice that for µi = pi, τ(µi) = 0; this follows from the fact that µσL = µσH = pi
implies that θ(µ)2 = Γ = (θ¯)2.
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LEMMA 2.1. The expected value of individual ability (2.6), conditional on the
observation of signal σL (σH ), is decreasing (increasing) in the level of information
λ.
PROOF. This property of monotonicity is immediately proved from the
computation of the respective first derivative with respect to λ:
dθ(µσL)
dλ
= − π(1− π)(θH − θL)
(2πλ+ 1− λ− π)2 < 0,
dθ(µσH)
dλ
=
π(1− π)(θH − θL)
(2πλ− λ− π)2 > 0.

It is straightforward to interpret this result: when the level of informa-
tion in the economy is minimum (λ = 1/2) everyone maintains the prior
belief to be of average ability θ¯. Increasing the the precision of the signals λ
implies that the Bayes updating “relies”more on the signal and the expecta-
tion of those agents who receive the signal σL (σH ) get progressively closer
to the the value θL (θH ). The following result defines the comparative statics
which relate to expression (2.16), namely aggregate output from effort net
of the distortive effect of redistribution on effort.
LEMMA 2.2. The expression of Γ (2.16) is (i) increasing and (ii) convex in the
level of information λ.
The proof is in Appendix A.1. The intuition behind this result is very
important. Lemma 2.2 shows that when the incentive-distortive effect of
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taxation is not taken into account, increasing information has a positive ef-
fect on aggregate output, as agents choose effort more optimally given the
true values of θL and θH . Expression Γ measures ex-ante or aggregate out-
put, net from the distortive effect of taxation, and therefore is a measure of
the value of information. The result of convexity in the value of informa-
tion is a known result in economic theory which goes back to the seminal
contribution of Radner and Stiglitz (1984).22 In order to study the compar-
ative statics of the endogenous variables of the model, I study the cases of
π > 1/2 and π < 1/2 separately.
Comparative statics for the case of π > 1/2
The case of π > 1/2 implies, together with the fact that λ ≥ 1/2, that pσL ≥
1/2 and therefore that the majority of the agents observes the signal σL and
that the prevailing tax rate is τ = τ(µσL). A proposition follows:
PROPOSITION 2.2. If π > 1/2, the prevailing tax rate τ is increasing in the
level of information λ.
PROOF. Given that π > 1/2 implies that the prevailing tax rate is τ =
τ(µσL), taking the expression for the tax rate (2.19) with µ
i = µσL , the proof
follows in a straightforward way from lemmas 2.1 and 2.2. 
From expression (2.19) it is easy to compute that the minimum value of
the tax rate is τ = 0, for λ = 1/2 and when θ(µ)2=Γ=(θ¯)2. In the same way, it
22Not only the assumptions for the result of of Radner and Stiglitz (1984) apply to my set-
up, one example of the Radner and Stiglitz (1984) result by Kihlstrom (1984) is based on
the same informative structure of this model.
2.4. COMPARATIVE STATICS 63
is also immediate that the maximum value of the tax rate is τ = 1− 1
2−(θ2L/θ
2)
,
for λ = 1. Notice also that given that π ∈ [0, 1), θ2L/θ2 < 1 and hence
τ ∈ [0, 1). The intuition behind the comparative static of the prevailing tax
rate is easy to understand. Given that the majority group is the one formed
by the agents who observe the signal σL, their prospects of upper mobility
decrease in the level of information and therefore their expected gains from
redistribution increase with the level of information.
In order to study the comparative statics which are relative to effort,
using (2.12) I define the optimal effort implemented by those who observe
σL:
(2.20) e|σL ≡ (1− τ)θ(µσL)/a,
and by those who observe σH :
(2.21) e|σH ≡ (1− τ)θ(µσH )/a.
Multiplying by the respective weights I obtain the expression of aggregate
effort:
(2.22) e¯ = (1− τ)(pσLθ(µσL) + (1− pσL)θ(µσH ))/a,
where it is easy to compute that pσLθ(µσL) + (1− pσL)θ(µσH ) = θ. A propo-
sition follows:
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PROPOSITION 2.3. If π > 1/2, aggregate effort (2.22) is decreasing in the
level of information λ.
The proof follows trivially from proposition 2.2 and from the fact that
θ is a constant. The result depends on the fact that the the only effect of
information on aggregate effort is through the distortive tax rate. To be
more precise, information impacts the expressions of individual effort both
through the tax rate and individual beliefs, nevertheless at the aggregate
level, information only impacts through the tax rate as the effect on the
beliefs of the two groups cancel out. Looking at the expression of the op-
timal effort which is exerted by those who observe signal σL (2.20), it is
immediate to see that it decreases in level of information λ, given that both
(1 − τ) and θ(µσL) decrease as suggested by lemmas 2.1 and 2.2. Instead,
the comparative static for the expression of optimal effort which is exerted
by those who observe signal σH (2.21) is ambiguous as (1− τ) is decreasing
but θ(µσH ) is increasing. The overall effect depends on the relative respon-
siveness of the two terms to λ. In a numerical example which I will present
in section 2.6 it will turn out to be non monotonic.
I discuss the comparative statics of output. Plugging (2.15) into (2.1) I
obtain the expression of aggregate output:
(2.23) y¯ = k + (1− τ)Γ/a.
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Notice that for π > 1/2 the effect of λ is not a-priori clear as given lemma 2.2
and proposition 2.2, λ has opposite effects on (1− τ) and Γ. Nevertheless I
find an interesting property:
PROPOSITION 2.4. If π > 1/2, the expression for aggregate output (2.23) is
(i)either monotonically decreasing or monotonically decreasing up to a point and
then monotonically increasing in the level of information λ 23, (ii) maximized for
λ = 1/2.
The proof is in Appendix A.2. This represents a striking policy result:
aggregate output is univocally maximized by the minimum level of infor-
mation. Even if the level of information λ has opposite effects on aggregate
output, as it increases distortive taxes τ but at the same time it increases
output from effort Γ through a better allocation of effort, the distortive ef-
fect through the tax rate is always dominant. The value of the aggregate
output for λ = 1/2 is y¯ = k + θ
2
/a, the value of the aggregate output for
λ = 1 is y¯ = k + θ
2
2
a(2θ2−θ2L)
> 0.
Comparative statics for the case of π < 1/2.
The case of π < 1/2 implies, together with the fact that λ ≥ 1/2, that pσL
≤ 1/2 and therefore that the majority of the agents observes the signal σH
and that the prevailing tax rate is τ = τ(µσH ). In this case the comparative
statics of τ with respect to λ are generally non-monotonic. To see this notice
that in expression (2.19) both θ(µ) and Γ increase for λ ∈ [1/2, 1] and so the
23This behavior can be described as single peaked from below and it is a form of quasi-
convexity.
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overall effect of λ is not a-priori clear. Nevertheless it is possible to find
some properties:
PROPOSITION 2.5. In the case that π < 1/2, the prevailing tax rate τ is (i)
always negative and (ii) if (2Γ∂θ(σH)
∂λ
) < θ(σH)
∂Γ
∂λ
, it is decreasing in the level of
information λ.
PROOF. It is useful to re-express (2.19) as
(2.24) τ =
Γ− θ(µσH )2
2Γ− θ(µσH )2
.
Notice that the numerator of (2.24) is always negative because Γ = pσLθ(µσL)
2+
(1 − pσL)θ(µσH )2 < θ(µσH )2 for λ ∈ [1/2, 1], as it is the case that θ(µσH ) >
θ(µσL). The denominator is always positive under assumption 2.1. This
proves the negativity of the expression. To prove monotonicity I notice that
the first derivative of τ with respect to λ is dτ
dλ
=
θ(µσH )
(
2Γ
∂θ(µσH
)
∂λ
−θ(µσH )
∂Γ
∂λ
)
(2Γ2−θ(µσH ))
2 .
Given lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, a sufficient condition for τ to be monotonic de-
creasing is therefore that (2Γ
∂θ(µσH )
∂λ
) < θ(µσH )
∂Γ
∂λ
. 
The negativity of the prevailing tax rate is easily interpretable. Given
that the majority group which sets the tax rate is formed by the agents
who observe the signal σH , whenever λ is greater than 1/2 they expect to
produce more than the average individual and therefore to loose out from
redistribution. When τ decreases monotonically in λ it is straightforward
that expression (2.23), lemma 2.2 and proposition 2.5 imply that aggregate
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output increases monotonically in λ. Moreover, given that the tax rate is al-
ways negative, then the aggregate output is always greater than in the case
of π ≥ 1/2.
Aggregate effort still depends exclusively on the tax rate, when τ de-
creases monotonically in λ it is straightforward that expression (2.22) im-
plies that aggregate effort increases monotonically in λ. Moreover, given
that the tax rate is always negative, also aggregate effort is always greater
than in the case of π ≥ 1/2. In the case in which τ decreases monotonically
in λ, e|σH increases in λ, as both (1 − τ) and θ(µσH ) increase. The effect of
λ on e|σL is instead partially ambiguous, as (1 − τ) increases in λ whereas
θ(µσL) decreases. The overall effect depends on how responsive are τ and
θ(µL) to λ.
2.5. Optimal Information
In the previous section I studied different comparative statics and the
results offered insights for policy questions such as the level of informa-
tion which maximizes output or how the level of information does affect
the voted tax rate. It is now a natural question to explore the comparative
statics in terms of welfare. More precisely, it is a natural question to explore
the level of information which maximizes the ex-ante utility, namely the
utility function at time 0 before that the agents receive the signal. In other
words I investigate whether someone behind the veil of ignorance desires
to remove the veil.
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In order to compute the expression of the expected utility at time 0, I
notice that at time 0, before receiving the signal, everyone is identical and
expects to have mean ability θ¯. It follows the expression of expected indi-
vidual output from effort:
(2.25) E[eiθi|I i0] = E[eθ|I i1] = (1− τ)Γ/a,
and the expression for expected individual squared effort:
(2.26) E[(ei)2|I i0] =
(1− τ)2Γ
a2
.
Plugging (2.25) and (2.26) into (2.11) and rearranging I obtain the expres-
sion for expected utility at t = 0:
(2.27) ui0 = k + (1− τ 2)Γ/2a.
Given that at time 0 everyone is identical this is the expression of both ex-
ante individual utility and aggregate welfare. If an agent had to choose an
optimal value of λ for the society at t = 0, she would choose a value of λ
which maximizes (2.27). The solution of the problem is not a-priori trivial.
Case of π > 1/2.
In the case of π > 1/2, lemma 2.2 and proposition 2.2 show that λ has
opposite effects on (1 − τ 2) and Γ so that the overall effect is not a-priori
clear. Nevertheless I find an interesting property:
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PROPOSITION 2.6. If π > 1/2, the expression of ex-ante utility (2.27) is ei-
ther monotonically decreasing or monotonically decreasing up to a point and then
monotonically increasing24.
PROOF. Expression (2.27) can be rewritten as k + (1 + τ)(1 − τ)Γ/2a.
Notice that the derivative of (1 − τ)Γ has already been studied in proposi-
tion 2.4. I rename (1 + τ) ≡ a(λ) and (1− τ)Γ ≡ b(λ), where a(λ) and b(λ)
are functions of λ. I study the sign of d(a(λ)b(λ))
dλ
= da
dλ
b + a db
dλ
in the interval
λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Using expression (A.4) in appendix A.2 it can be checked that
this expression is strictly negative for λ = 1/2. Notice that given propo-
sition 2.2 da
dλ
b > 0 and that given proposition 2.4 a db
dλ
can change sign and
become positive at most once. Appendix A.2 also shows that a db
dλ
starts
negative and increases monotonically. Therefore it follows that the entire
expression for the derivative d(a(λ)b(λ))
dλ
starts negative for λ = 1/2 and if
becomes positive it will continue to be positive. 
This result implies that in the case of π > 1/2, there are corner solu-
tions: either λ = 1/2 or λ = 1 maximize ex-ante utility (2.27). The result
is interesting because it shows that the ex-ante optimal level of informa-
tion for the economy is either a completely uninformative signal (λ = 1/2)
or a completely informative signal λ = 1. In other words agents either
want to stay behind the veil of ignorance or want to remove it completely.
It is important to stress the economic intuition behind this result. Firstly,
24This behavior can be described as single peaked from below and it is a form of quasi-
convexity.
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increasing the level of information has a trade-off effect, on one hand it
improves the allocation of individual effort but on the other hand it raises
inefficient redistributive taxation, therefore ex-ante utility (2.27) does not
increase monotonically in the level of information λ. Secondly, the con-
vexity of the value of information Γ (lemma 2.2) implies that – as stated in
proposition 2.6 – that ex-ante utility (2.27) is either monotonically decreas-
ing or quasi-convex and therefore the corner solutions.
Case of π < 1/2.
As explained with the analysis of the comparative static in the previous
section, in the case of π < 1/2 it is possible that τ does not have amonotonic
behavior and this makes the effect of λ on (2.27) not clear. In the case in
which the condition for the monotonic behavior given in proposition (2.5)
applies, then both (1− τ 2) and Γ increase in λ for λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Hence (2.27)
is maximized for λ = 0 or λ = 1, i.e. for a perfectly informative signal.
Case of individual information λi.
In order to gain further insights, I temporarily depart from the original set-
up assuming that each agent i at t = 0 can individually chose the optimal
precision λi of the signal to be observed at t = 1 by herself. In this case the
optimal value of λi would maximize the expected utility at t = 0 taking the
choices of the other agents as given. Plugging (2.25) and (2.26) into (2.11) I
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obtain the individual problem at t = 0:
(2.28) λi = arg max{(1− τ)(k¯ + (1− τ(λ))Γ(λi)/a)+
τ(λ)(k¯ + (1− τ(λ))Γ(λ)/a)− (1− τ(λ))2Γ(λi)/2a}.
As a single individual cannot influence the prevailing tax rate, this it taken
as given when the optimal λi is chosen. The problem has an easy solution
because λi only influences the object through Γ(λi), which monotonically
increases in the level of information (lemma 2.2). Therefore if individuals
were free to autonomously choose the individual level of information, then
everyone would choose to be perfectly informed and therefore the economy
would be in a state which is identical to the case of perfect information
λ = 1 in the original set-up. This result helps to approach the analysis of
the next section.
2.6. Politico-Economic Equilibrium
In this section I consider the level of information λ in the economy to be
an endogenous outcome and I introduce the concept of Politico-Economic
equilibrium. Using the analysis of the previous section, I consider that the
prevailing level of information λ in the economy is the one which maxi-
mizes the ex-ante utility. Such value of λ could be chosen by a benevolent
planner, it could be a voting outcome or it could be the outcome of any
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other collective choice. Being everyone ex-ante identical, as long as the op-
timal λ is computed at t = 0, everyone would agree on the same value of
information. Once the level of information has been fixed as the ex-ante
optimal, individual and aggregate choices and outcomes follow as already
described in the previous sections. A definition follows:
DEFINITION 2.1. I define a Politico–Economic Equilibrium as the pre-
vailing level of information, beliefs and voted rate of redistribution (λ, µσL , µσH , τ )
such that
(i) the prevailing level of information is ex ante optimal, i.e. λ = arg max u0,
(ii) beliefs are bayesan-rational, i.e. beliefs µσL and µσH are respectively
given by (2.4) and (2.5),
(iii) the prevailing rate of redistribution τ is the ideal rate (2.19) of is the
median voter.
Analyzing the case of π > 1/2, the results of the previous section show
that both minimum information (λ = 1/2) and perfect information (λ = 1)
can be ex-ante optimal. It is easy to construct numerical examples in which
both λ = 1/2 and λ = 1 are global maxima of the ex-ante utility function
(2.27). Plugging λ = 1/2 and λ = 1 in (2.27) it can be easily computed that
u0|λ= 1
2
= (θ¯)2 and that u0|λ=1 = (θ¯
2)2(3θ¯2−2θ2L)
(2θ¯2−θ2L)
2 . While the set of parameters
such that both λ = 1/2 and λ = 1 are global maxima of u0 has zero measure,
it follows that there are sets with positive measure such that both λ = 1/2
and λ = 1 are local maxima. It is not immediate to find inequality relations
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Ex-ante Utility
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FIGURE 2.1. Ex-ante utility for π = 0.761, θL = 1, θH = 1.5,
a = 1, k = 0.
on the parameters stating which of the two maxima is the global one, but
numerical exercises show clearly that increasing π or the difference θH − θL
will imply that the value of u0|λ=1 increases relatively to u0|λ= 1
2
. Therefore
the multiplicity of equilibria can be interpreted as saying that societies with
minimal differences in the parameters π, θL, θH may find very different lev-
els of information to be optimal.
Example of Multiple Politico-Economic Equilibria.
I present a numerical example with multiple Politico-Economic Equilibria.
I consider the following values of the parameters: π = 0.761, θL = 1, θH =
1.5, a = 0.5, k = 0. I plug those values in (2.4), (2.5), (2.7) (2.19), (2.16)
and consequently those expressions in (2.27). I obtain a map of ui0 in λ,
which I plot in figure 2.1. I verify that the function has two global maxima
for λ = 1/2 and λ = 1 with value 1.25352. Therefore given the value of
the parameters, both perfect information and minimum information are
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FIGURE 2.2. τ for π = 0.761, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, a = 1, k = 0.
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FIGURE 2.3. Γ for π = 0.761, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, a = 1, k = 0.
ex-ante optimal for the society. A society with a higher (lower) value of pi
or higher (lower) value in the difference θH − θL than the specified ones
would find λ = 1 (λ = 1/2) to be optimal.
Interpretation of the multiple Politico-Economic Equilibria.
I plot τ and Γ in figures 2.2 and 2.3 respectively. As explained in the pre-
vious section, the uninformative equilibrium is characterized by a lower τ
and an higher Γ than the informative equilibrium, the two variables have
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opposite effects on the ex-ante utility, hence the multiple equilibria. I can
further interpret these two equilibria plotting the expressions of the effort
exerted by those who observe σL (2.20) and σH (2.21) as functions of λ, in
figures 2.4 and (2.5) respectively. I also plot the expression of aggregate ef-
fort (2.22) in figure 2.6. The expression of optimal effort (2.12) shows that
the greater is τ and the lower is the optimal effort, hence the informative
equilibrium is characterized by a severe moral hazard problem as τ is at
the maximum level. It is less immediate to notice an opposite effect of ad-
verse selection. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show that the greater is the precision
of the signal and the more separated is the level of effort exerted by the
two groups. When the signal is completely uninformative everyone pools
to the same level of effort, whereas when the signal is perfectly informa-
tive the highly productive choose the maximum level of effort and the low
productive choose the minimum value of effort. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 respec-
tively show that both aggregate effort and output are maximized at the
uninformative equilibrium.
The uninformative equilibrium can be interpreted as a US-type equilib-
rium. In this equilibrium agents have wrong beliefs about the real return on
effort. Both groups of agents hold the same belief and exert the same levels
of effort (pooling equilibrium); in particular the majority of agents (which
are those with low ability L) are biased towards optimism as they believe
to be more productive than what they truly are. In this equilibrium, the tax
rate is at the minimum level, whereas aggregate effort and output are at the
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FIGURE 2.4. Effort given σL for π = 0.761, θL = 1, θH = 1.5,
a = 1, k = 0.
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FIGURE 2.5. Effort given σH for π = 0.761, θL = 1, θH = 1.5,
a = 1, k = 0.
maximum level. The informative equilibrium can instead be interpreted as
a Europe-type equilibrium. In this equilibrium the two groups of agents
have correct beliefs about the real return on effort. As the low productive
agents are the majority, their preferred tax rate is the prevailing in the econ-
omy, hence the level of redistribution is higher than in the US-type equi-
librium. High redistribution and correct beliefs about the return on effort
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Aggregate Effort
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FIGURE 2.6. Aggregate effort for π = 0.761, θL = 1, θH = 1.5,
a = 1, k = 0.
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FIGURE 2.7. Aggregate Output for π = 0.761, θL = 1, θH =
1.5, a = 1, k = 0.
imply that the low productive ones minimize the effort whereas the high
productive ones maximize it (separating equilibrium). The distortive ef-
fect of taxation results in lower aggregate effort and aggregate output than
those at the uninformative equilibrium.
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2.7. Interpretation and Generalization of the Results
The result of the last section should not be interpreted as stating that Eu-
ropeans are perfectly informed whereas Americans are not. The first con-
sideration to be made is that in a more general set-up it does not have to be
the case that the more informative equilibrium is characterized by perfect
information: in section 2.8, taking into account the possibility of heteroge-
neous endowments, I show that interior values of λ can be optimal. The
second consideration to be made is that the same results in terms of multi-
ple equilibria would follow with a different underlying true distribution of
the θ′s. For example, take a case in which the true distribution of the θ’s is
very complicated and all that agents can get to know is the average ability
and a fraction π (1−π) of agents has average ability θL (θH). If the structure
of the signal is still the one in (2.2), then the problem is the same – this can
be seen from the fact that the expressions (2.6) and (2.16) do not change –
hence the same results apply. Or again the same results would apply in the
case of homogeneous returns and aggregate macroeconomic shocks: θi = θ
for all i and again all that agents know is that and with probability π (1−π)
the average value of θ is θL (θH ). The fact that the true distribution of the
θ′s remain unknown shows that a more precise signal in the Europe-type
equilibrium does not mean that Europeans get to know the truth whereas
Americans do not.
The result should instead be interpreted as showing the possibility and
the implications of more versus less separating information structures or
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cultures. In order to interpret the result about the existence of multiple
equilibria correctly it is necessary to understand the key-driver of the re-
sult. Going back to expression (2.27), it is clear that the fact that there may
be multiple optimal values of λ – and therefore multiple equilibria – comes
from the non-monotonic effect of λ on (1− τ 2)Γ. In particular the informa-
tion structure in (2.2) implies lemma 2.2 and therefore that the more precise
is the signal λ and the greater is Γ. This consideration helps to understand
the following general result:
THEOREM 1. Given the ex-ante objective function (2.27), if τ ∈ [0, 1] is part
of a politico-economic equilibrium, then the higher the rate of redistribution τ and
the higher the level of information λ in the equilibrium.
PROOF. In a politico-economic equilibrium, λ= arg max (1 − τ 2)Γ. As-
sume without loss of generality that two different λ′s are part of a dif-
ferent equilibria with λ′ > λ′′ > 1/2. Given lemma 2.2, this implies that
Γ(λ′) > Γ(λ′′) and therefore that τ(λ′) > τ(λ′′). 
The result shows that if multiple equilibria exist then it must be the case
that ex- ante there is a trade-off in increasing the precision of the signal: in-
creasing the precision of the signal increases Γ, but increasing the precision
of the signal can also increase τ . Hence, when the effect of λ on the object
(2.27) is non-monotonic, then multiple equilibria are possible. In economic
terms the trade-off is between the positive effect of an increase in the preci-
sion of the signal, namely that more information reduces adverse selection
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as agents choose effort more optimally given their abilities, and the neg-
ative effect, namely that more information can increase the prevailing tax
rate and this creates a moral hazard effect which reduces aggregate effort.
It is important to notice that the theorem applies independently from the
type of comparative statics. Theorem 1 shows that in the case of multiple
equilibria, a US-(Europe-) type equilibrium is relatively characterized by:
(i) a less (more) informative signal and therefore (ii) less (more) separated
beliefs, (iii) lower (higher) redistribution and therefore (iv) higher (lower)
aggregate effort and output.
In other words, the result states that the case of multiple equilibria is a
case in which an economy relatively characterized by more adverse selec-
tion and less moral hazard is ex-ante equally optimal to another one charac-
terized by less adverse selection and more moral hazard. The introduction
has motivated how this interpretation is supported by empirical and anec-
dotal evidence and how the features of the two equilibria seems to offer
new insights about the observed political and economic features of differ-
ent societies. This result is general and robust as it does not depend on
the assumption of homogenous endowments 25 or on the underlying dis-
tribution of the abilities, because these feature do not change the ex-ante
problem, or again on the linearity of the utility function. In the next two
25As section 2.8 will show, with heterogenous endowments technical difficulties arise as
changing the level of information changes the identity of the median voter and different
voters prefer different tax rates given different endowments, so the comparative statics
are generally discontinuous; nevertheless the ex-ante optimal λ still has to maximize the
object (2.27) and therefore theorem 1 still applies.
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sections I show that the main results still hold in both a setup with het-
erogenous endowments and concave utility in wealth.
2.8. Analysis with with heterogenous endowments
In this section I explore the possibility of heterogeneous endowments
as I assume that ki takes value kL for a fraction α of the population and
value kH for the remaining fraction 1 − α, with kL < kH , and that θi takes
value θL for a fraction π of the population and value θH for the remaining
fraction 1 − π, with θL < θH . The two distributions are independent. This
last assumption and the low of large numbers which applies to this large
economy together imply that (θi, ki) = (θL, kL) for a fraction πα, (θ
i, ki) =
(θH , kL) for a fraction (1 − π)α, (θi, ki) = (θL, kH) for a fraction π(1 − α)
and (θi, ki) = (θH , kH) for a fraction (1 − π)(1 − α) of the population. The
new version of (2.18) – the indirect utility in τ – is given by the following
expression:
(2.29) uit = τ(k
i − k¯) + (1− τ)2θ(µi)2/a+ τ(1− τ)Γ/a− (1− τ)2θ(µi)2/2a.
Assumption 2.1 still assures that expression (2.29) is strictly concave as the
variable k does not enter the second order conditions. The new expression
for the ideal tax rate of agent i follows:
(2.30) τ(ki, µi) = 1− 1 +
a(ki−k¯)
Γ
2− θ(µi)2
Γ
.
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As explained by Benabou and Tirole (2006), the numerator of (2.30) in-
dicates that a lower relative endowment (ki − k¯) naturally increases the
desired tax rate and that wether progressive or regressive, such distribu-
tive goals must be traded off against distortions to the effort-elastic com-
ponent of the tax base (moral hazard problem). As before, the denomina-
tor indicates that increases in the prospects of upper mobility decrease the
ideal tax rate. The tuple (ki, µi) identifies the preferred tax rate by voter i
and given α, π and λ, there are four groups of voters in the economy. If
α ∈ (1/2, 1] (α ∈ [0, 1/2)) the majority of the agents has an endowment
ki = kL
(
ki = kH
)
. If pσL > 1/2
(
pσL < 1/2
)
, the majority of the agents
holds a belief µσL
(
µσH
)
at t = 1. I analyze the voting outcome analyzing
the various possible cases.
Voting outcome with heterogenous endowments.
Before proceeding with the various cases notice that the fact that λ ≥ 1/2
implies that µσH ≥ µσL and therefore the following ranking of preferred tax
rates: τ(kH , µσH )≤min{τ(kH , µσL), τ(kL, µσH )}≤max{τ(kH , µσL), τ(kL, µσH)}
≤ τ(kL, µσL).26
Case 1: α ≥ 1/2 and π ≥ 1/2. α ≥ 1/2 implies that the majority of the
agents has ki = kL. λ ≥ 1/2 and π ≥ 1/2 together imply that pσL ≥ 1/2.
There are two possible sub-cases.
Case 1.1: αpσL > 1/2. The pivotal group is the one who prefers τ(kL, µσL);
this because more than half of the population belongs to this group.
26This because τ(ki, µi)monotonically decreases in both ki and µi.
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Case 1.2: αpσL < 1/2. If τ(kL, µσH ) > τ(kH , µσL) then the pivotal group is
the one who prefers τ(kL, µσH), this because the ranking implies that the
group with τ(kL, ·) includes the median voter but this does not belong to
the group with τ(kL, µσL). If τ(kH , µσL) > τ(kL, µσH ) then the pivotal group
is the one who prefers τ(kH , µσL), this because the ranking implies that the
group with τ(·, µσL) includes the median voter but this does not belong to
the group with τ(kL, µσL).
Case 2: α ≥ 1/2 and π ≤ 1/2. π ≤ 1/2 and λ ≥ 1/2 imply that pσL ≤ 1/2,
therefore αpσL > 1/2 is never verified and hence Case 1.1 is never verified.
Therefore Case 2 has the same outcome of Case 1.2.
Case 3: α ≤ 1/2 and π ≥ 1/2. α ≤ 1/2 implies that the majority of the
agents has ki = kH . λ ≥ 1/2 and π ≥ 1/2 together imply that pσL ≥ 1/2.
There are two possible sub-cases.
Case 3.1: (1 − α)pσL > 1/2. The pivotal group is the one who prefers
τ(kH , µσL); this because more than half of the population belongs to this
group.
Case 3.2: (1−α)pσL < 1/2. If τ(kL, µσH ) > τ(kH , µσL) then the pivotal group
is the one who prefers τ(kH , µσL) whereas if τ(kH , µσL) > τ(kL, µσH ) then
the pivotal group is the one who prefers τ(kL, µσH).
Case 4: α ≤ 1/2 and π ≤ 1/2. π ≤ 1/2 and λ ≥ 1/2 together imply that
pσL ≤ 1/2, therefore (1−α)pσL > 1/2 is never verified and hence Case 3.1 is
never verified. Therefore Case 4 has the same outcome as case 3.2.
2.8. ANALYSIS WITH WITH HETEROGENOUS ENDOWMENTS 84
It is important to notice how heterogenous endowments can imply dis-
continuous comparative statics. In order to see this assume to be in case 1.1
where the pivotal tax rate is τ(kL, µσL). If λ increases the pivotal tax rate re-
mains τ(kL, µσL) and increases monotonically till τ(kL, θL) for λ = 1. If λ de-
creases it is certain that there will be a λ∗ ∈ (1/2, 1) small enough such that
the condition αpσL > 1/2 is not satisfied. This because for λ = 1/2 the con-
dition is not satisfied and therefore for the continuity of αpσL in λ there will
be a value λ∗ arbitrarily close to λ = 1/2 (the greater is α and the smaller
is λ∗) such that the condition does not hold. For this λ∗, either τ(kL, µσH)
or τ(kH , µσL) becomes pivotal and hence the pivotal tax rate jumps down-
wards in a discontinuous way. Discontinuous comparative statics imply
the possibility of interior welfare maximizing values of λ even if the com-
parative statics are monotonic. The following numerical example shows
this possibility.
Example of multiple equilibria with discontinuous comparative stat-
ics.
In the case of heterogenous endowments the ex-ante objective function is
still given by (2.27), where k = k¯ = αkL + (1−)kH . Consider the following
values: α = 0.8, π = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, a = 8, kL = 1, kH = 1.812.
Such values imply that pσL = 0.4λ + 0.3. If there is a value λ
∗ such that
α(0.4λ∗ + 0.3) > 1/2, then λ∗ is a point of discontinuity. For such a λ∗ to
exist it must be that 0.7α > 1/2, i.e. α > 5/7. I take the case of α = 0.8,
which implies λ∗ ≃ 0.81. I analyze the object ui0 as a function of λ. For
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λ > λ∗ the voted tax rate is τ = τ(kL, µσL). I plot this as a function of λ
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FIGURE 2.8. τ(kL, µL) for π = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, a = 8,
kL = 1, kH = 1.812.
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FIGURE 2.9. τ(kL, µH) (continuous line) and τ(kH , µL)
(pointed line) for π = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, a = 8, kL = 1,
kH = 1.812.
in figure 2.8. For λ < λ∗ the voted tax rate is the greater between τ(kL, µσH)
and τ(kH , µσL). I plot both two as functions of λ in figure 2.9. The figure
shows that τ(kL, µσH ) is greater throughout the interval, therefore for λ < λ
∗
the voted tax rate is τ(kL, µσH ). I plot the voted tax rate in figure 2.10. It can
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FIGURE 2.10. Prevailing tax rate for π = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5,
a = 8, kL = 1, kH = 1.812.
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FIGURE 2.11. Welfare for π = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, a = 8,
kL = 1, kH = 1.812.
be computed that ui0 is maximized and equal to 1.63128 for both λ = 0.81
and λ = 1, hence the multiple equilibria. I plot ui0, τ , Γ and the optimal
values of individual and aggregate effort respectively in figures 2.11, 2.12,
2.13, 2.14, 2.15. I also plot figures 2.13 and 2.14 together in figure 2.16, where
the thicker line represents figure 2.13.
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FIGURE 2.12. Aggregate Output for π = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5,
a = 8, kL = 1, kH = 1.812.
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FIGURE 2.13. Effort after the observation of σL for π = 0.7,
θL = 1, θH = 1.5, a = 8, kL = 1, kH = 1.812.
2.9. Analysis with concave utility
As already explained in section 2.5, in the model that I have presented
the trade-off effect of information – and hence the possibility of multiple
ex-ante optimal levels of information – arise because on one hand infor-
mation increases ex-ante inefficient taxes (hence increases the moral haz-
ard problem) and on the other hand information improves the efficiency
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FIGURE 2.14. Effort after the observation of σH for π = 0.7,
θL = 1, θH = 1.5, a = 8, kL = 1, kH = 1.812.
Aggregate Effort
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
0.05
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
lambda
FIGURE 2.15. Aggregate effort for π = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5,
a = 8, kL = 1, kH = 1.812.
of effort’s allocations (hence reduces the adverse selection problem). One
natural question to ask is wether this trade-off – and hence the result of
multiple equilibria – is robust to the introduction of risk aversion in the
problem. With a concave ex-ante utility function in consumption, ceteris
paribus, redistribution is ex-ante efficient. On the other hand redistribu-
tion still decreases individual effort and therefore decreases the amount of
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FIGURE 2.16. Comparison of effort levels for π = 0.7, θL = 1,
θH = 1.5, a = 8, kL = 1, kH = 1.812.
output which is redistributed, hence the overall effect of taxation on ex-ante
utility is not clear a priori. Moreover, with a concave ex-ante utility function
in consumption not even the overall effect of information is a-priori clear.
This is the case evenwhen it is ignored the effect that information has on the
prevailing tax rate, in other words when the level of redistribution is fixed.
The reason for this is that on one hand information separates the levels
of exerted effort implemented (which is ex-ante un-optimal given the con-
cavity of the utility function) but on the other hand information improves
effort’s allocations and therefore it increases the amount of output which
is redistributed. Hence in the case in which information increases the pre-
vailing tax rate, a concave utility function implies that increasing the level
of information has two positive effects: to increase ex -ante optimal taxes
and to increase aggregate effort and output (which will be redistributed).
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Increasing the level of information has also two negative effects: to separate
the levels of effort and output (which is ex ante un-optimal given concav-
ity) and to decrease individual effort through higher taxation and therefore
to decrease the output which will be redistributed.
In order to gain insights about the overall effect of information and to
check the robustness of the result that ex-ante utility is nor monotonic nor
concave in the level of information I present some numerical examples. I in-
troduce a utility function which is concave in consumption at time 0, when
welfare is evaluated, but I maintain the same linear utility function for the
rest of the problem, namely when both taxes are voted for and when effort
is chosen. The reason for doing this is to maintain the tractability. As it
is shown in the analysis of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and followers, us-
ing a concave function for the choice of effort and voting implies that the
prevailing tax rate is not an explicit function. 27
2.9.1. Numerical examples with concave utility. Without loss of gen-
erality I fix that ki = 0 for all i and that a = 1 in order to simplify the
computations. Agent i utility function at time 0 is concave in consumption
and it is given by the following expression:
(2.31) ui0 = E
i
0[
1
γ
(ci)γ − (ei)2/2],
27The type of utility function which I introduce can be shown to belong to the class of
RINCE Preferences introduced by Farmer (1990). This class of preferences imply that the
utility is concave over non-stochastic outcomes (like the period 0 utility function), but it
becomes risk neutral over stochastic outcomes (like the period 1 utility function).
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with γ < 1. The period 1 problem is still the one described in section 2.2,
hence the expression for optimal individual effort is still (2.12) and the ex-
pression for the aggregate product of effort is still given by (2.25). I plug
those expressions together with (2.9) and (2.1) into (2.31) and I obtain the
expression for expected utility conditional on the observation of σL:
(2.32)
u0σL = µL
1
γ
((1−τ)θLeσL+τ(1−τ)Γ)γ+(1−µL)
1
γ
((1−τ)θHeσL+τ(1−τ)Γ)γ−(eσL)2/2,
and a symmetric expression given the observation of σH , where eσi is given
by expression (2.12) and it represents optimal individual effort conditional
on the observation of σi. Using those expressions, I can rewrite expression
(2.31) as
(2.33) ui0 = pσLuσL + (1− pσL)uσH =
πλ
1
γ
((1− τ)θLeσL + τ(1− τ)Γ)γ+
(1− π)(1− λ) 1
γ
((1− τ)θHeσL + τ(1− τ)Γ)γ+
π(1− λ) 1
γ
((1− τ)θLeσH + τ(1− τ)Γ)γ+
(1− π)λ1
γ
((1− τ)θHeσH + τ(1− τ)Γ)γ − (1− τ)2Γ/2.
It is clear from expression (2.33) that on one hand τ has the positive
effect of redistributing and on the other hand τ has the negative effect to
decrease the amount of resources which are redistributed. It is also clear
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that also increasing the level of information λ has two opposite effects on
welfare. One one hand there is a positive effect because Γ increases in λ
(lemma 2.2) and on the other hand increasing λ separates the levels of ef-
fort implemented (lemma 2.1) which is non optimal given the concavity.
In order to check for the overall effect of the level of information on ex-
ante utility I proceed with some numerical examples. I consider the case in
which pσL ≥ 1/2 and the majority of agents observe σL so that the prevail-
ing tax rate is τσL . It follows from proposition 2.2 that in this case the voted
tax rate τ increases in the level of information.
I consider a numerical example with a coefficient of risk aversion of
γ = −1. I plot expression (2.33) as a function of λ in figure 2.17. The figure
shows that there is an interior solution in terms of λ. This example proves
the possibility of non monotonicity of information.
Ex-ante Utility
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FIGURE 2.17. Welfare for π = 0.8, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, γ = −1.
Decreasing the coefficient of risk aversion implies that the beneficial ef-
fect of information through the tax rate is less valued. I Consider the case
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of γ = 0.8. I plot expression (2.33) as a function of λ in figure 2.18. The fig-
ure shows that the optimal value of information is still unique but smaller
than before. This example shows that also with a concave utility in con-
sumption, ex-ante utility does not have to be concave in information. It is
Ex-ante Utility
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FIGURE 2.18. Welfare for π = 0.8, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, γ = 0.8.
also possible to have a case with multiple optimal values of information.
I consider the case of γ = 0.845, I plot expression (2.33) as a function of λ
in figure 2.19. As before, the equilibrium with relatively higher (lower) in-
formation has higher (lower) taxes and more (less) separated effort choices,
while the solution with lower (higher) information has lower (higher) taxes
but less separated effort choices.
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FIGURE 2.19. Welfare for π = 0.8, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, γ = 0.845.
2.10. Conclusion
This chapter developed a simple but rich theoretical model in order to
analyze the role of incomplete information in the determining heteroge-
neous beliefs and different politico-economic equilibria. Different compar-
ative statics can be studied with this model and the results can be used in
order to answer natural policy questions as the welfare or output maximiz-
ing level of information.
The theoretical model presented in the chapter interprets a US-type vs a
Europe-type politico-economic equilibrium as characterized by relative (i)
higher adverse selection – individual beliefs and effort levels are pooling
to similar levels despite underlying heterogeneity in the true distribution
of the return on effort – (ii) lower redistribution (iii) lower moral hazard –
redistribution is low and this does not distort individual effort much (iv)
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higher aggregate effort and output. Conversely the Europe-type politico-
economic equilibrium is interpreted as an equilibrium characterized by rel-
ative (i) lower adverse selection (ii) higher redistribution (iii) higher moral
hazard – taxation is high and this diminish individual effort (iv) low aggre-
gate effort and output. The two equilibria are both ex ante optimal. The
results are robust to variations of the basic framework, as the introduction
of heterogenous endowments and a concave utility function.
It is worthy to stress that the presentedmodel does not give clear predic-
tions about the heterogeneity of exerted effort and the levels of inequality
in two different equilibria. In the basic version with homogenous endow-
ment k across agents, the non informative equilibrium (λ = 1/2) is a pool-
ing equilibrium where every agent exerts the same effort, whereas in the
full informative equilibrium (λ = 1) effort levels are separated and hence
output is relatively more heterogenous (pre-tax inequality is higher). This
should not lead to conclude that the model predicts that the Europe-type
equilibrium is characterized by higher inequality andmore separated effort
levels than the US-type equilibriumwhich, as discussed in the introduction,
would contrast some empirical evidence. In the more general exposition of
the model with heterogenous endowments, where interior values of λ can
be welfare maximizing, it can be the case that despite the fact that the more
informative equilibrium is characterized by more separated beliefs the fact
that redistribution is higher implies that effort levels are less separated and
that output before taxes is less heterogenous. In such case, the driving force
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behind the fact that effort levels are less separated in the Europe-type equi-
librium would be the distortive effect of taxation.28 Moreover, in the model
with heterogenous endowments the fact that the rate of redistribution does
not change continuously and monotonically in λ implies that the separa-
tion of effort levels does not have to increase in the level of information, as
shown by figure 2.16. In conclusion, the presented model focuses on the
determinants of different beliefs and rates of redistribution but cannot say
much about the levels of inequality as those depend on the values of the
initial endowments (both directly and through their role in affecting voted
redistribution) and in the presented model there is no specification of the
wealth generating process (which should naturally be seen as dynamic).
Therefore the contribution of the next chapter will be precisely at this level.
28This point seems to have some robust empirical support, see for example Prescott (2004).
CHAPTER 3
Redistributive Politics under Optimally Incomplete
Information in an intergenerational model with bequests
3.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter I presented a model which studies how incom-
plete information about the determinants of individual wealth (i.e. incom-
plete information about the value of return to effort versus the role of luck
or other predetermined factors) can affect, through individual beliefs, the
individual preferences over redistribution and the individual optimal deci-
sions of how much effort to exert. Consequently the model analyzes also
the impact of incomplete information on the prevailing level of redistribu-
tion under majority voting and on aggregate outcomes as aggregate effort,
aggregate output and welfare. The model offers policy results in terms
of comparative statics and insights about the various observed differences
between laissez-faire versus welfare state type of economies. The previ-
ous model does not have a full dynamic setting, because it describes a one
period economy where individuals vote, exert effort and receive income.
Thus, the fact that the model does not analyze savings, wealth accumula-
tion or intergenerational transfers implies that the model cannot say any-
thing about the dynamics of inequality and wealth mobility over time. It is
97
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a natural further step to study how incomplete information can impact be-
liefs, political and economic outcomes in a dynamic set up in order to gain
insights about the dynamics of inequality andwealthmobility. The first rea-
son is that if individual beliefs about the underlying determinants of wealth
are important determinants of individual voting and effort choices, then it
is also the case that the same beliefs are also important determinants of the
dynamics of inequality and mobility. The second reason is that the indi-
vidual beliefs about the determinants of wealth are intrinsically very much
related to the individual beliefs about the determinants and the extent of
mobility, which is a dynamic process, therefore it is important to study such
beliefs in a dynamic setting. For this reason, in order to gain insights about
the role of beliefs in affecting the dynamics of inequality and mobility, as
well as in shaping the preferences for redistribution, I introduce the infor-
mation set up of the previous chapter in an intergenerational model with
bequests and stochastically evolving skills. There are three main elements
in the model. The first element is the dynamic set-up with with bequests
and stochastic skills which allows to analyze intergenerational inequality
and mobility. The second element is represented by the political economy
side: as in the model of the previous chapter, I introduce a linear redis-
tribution scheme, where the prevailing rate of redistribution is set by the
median voter. The third element is the information structure which builds
on the model of the previous chapter. In every period the level of infor-
mation about the true value of individual skills can vary in a continuous
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way from a completely uninformative structure in which every individual
only has the same prior information about the distribution of skills to the
case that each individual is perfectly informed about her own skills. As it
was the case with themodel of the previous chapter the level of information
should be interpreted as an institutional feature of the economy which gov-
ernments or other institutions can possibly affect through various policies:
educational policies, the release of information or propaganda. The present
chapter introduces a dynamic set-up with bequests in the previous model.
As in the previous chapter, one exercise consists in analyzing how different
levels of incomplete information affect the endogenous outcomes (individ-
ual voting and effort, redistribution, aggregate effort, output and welfare)
and another exercise consists in considering also the level of information as
endogenous and analyzing which levels of information are optimal for the
society and can arise in an equilibrium.
The model of this chapter constitutes a first attempt to link three differ-
ent strands of theoretical literature: models of intergenerational inequality,
models on the political economy of redistribution, models which analyze
the role of the beliefs about the underlying determinants of wealth. The
related literature has already been extensively reviewed in chapter 1.
(i) Neoclassical models of intergenerational inequality. It is the seminal
paper of Stiglitz (1969) to be commonly considered the first modern analy-
sis of the distribution of wealth and income among individuals. The model
of Stiglitz presents a strong result of long run convergence in the dynamics
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of individual income which parallels the seminal result obtained by Solow
(1956) in the context of country income. In the model of Stiglitz agents
are endowed with capital (accumulated factor) and labor (non accumu-
lated factor), markets are competitive and both factors are paid at their mar-
ginal return. The assumptions of diminishing returns to capital and of an
identical concave saving function across individuals imply that individual
wealth increases over time in a concave fashion and eventually converges
to a steady state value which does not depend on the initial level of wealth.
In other words, in the model inequality across families is solely determined
by the differences in the non accumulated factors (i.e. the differences in
individual skills) and when all families are equally endowed with the non
accumulated factor (i.e. skills are homogenous across families) every fam-
ily converges to the same level of wealth. Building on this seminal model,
other authors have extended the basic set-up in order to study intergener-
ational inequality and mobility. In this context, saving choices have been
micro-founded as decisions to leave bequests for the future generation. For
what concerns bequests, two main formalization have been used in the lit-
erature: one in which bequests enter directly into the utility function of
the parents (Atkinson (1980)) and one in which parents care about their
children’s utility per se (Becker and Tomes (1979)). Those two alternative
formulations can give different conclusions about the dynamics of accumu-
lation, inequality and the effects of redistributive taxation. Developing this
type of analysis, Becker and Tomes (1986) focus on the intergenerational
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transmission of abilities across generations and study the implications for
the investments in human capital and the resulting dynamics of inequal-
ity.1 More recently there has been extensive work on models with credit
market imperfections and poverty traps. The basic idea behind the effect of
imperfect financial markets is that if poor individuals are prevented from
borrowing and hence cannot invest, then in a dynamic context initial in-
equalities may persist and some dynasties remain stuck into a poverty trap.
Therefore these models can produce persistent inequality across dynasties
abstracting from the effect of skills’ differences. The most relevant models
in this group are the models of Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and New-
man (1993), Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997).
(ii) Models of political economy. The contribution of these models is
represented by the fact that the prevailing level of redistribution is not ex-
ogenous but it is the result of a voting process. This idea has been intro-
duced by the seminal paper of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and the sem-
inal contributions which introduced it in dynamic macroeconomic mod-
els are those of Perotti (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and
Tabellini (1994). The main idea behind those models is that, as in Meltzer
and Richard (1981), given the median voter theorem, greater inequality
translates into a poorer median voter relative to the country’s mean in-
come and therefore the greater the inequality and the higher it is the voted
level of redistribution in the economy. High levels of redistribution in turn
1See the review of Piketty (1998) for more on the literature on bequests and intergenera-
tional mobility.
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lower individual incentives to accumulate capital and hence the result that
inequality lowers growth. In those models inequality derives from the fact
that skills are fixed and persistently different across dynasties. Therefore
such models are focused on the study of the determinants and the impli-
cations of redistribution but cannot give insights about the dynamics of
mobility. Such models have been quite influential, especially in bringing
endogenous political choices into the big picture. They also stimulated a
great deal of discussion about the relationship between inequality, growth
and redistribution. Some empirical evidence challenged the conclusion on
the basis of two different observations. The first observation is that it does
not always seem to be the case that inequality is detrimental to growth,
even though the evidence in favor is quite large. The second and major
challenge comes from the observation that it does not seem to be the case
that more inequality implies higher redistribution. This second challenge
inspired a new group of theoretical models whose major focus is to ex-
plain the described evidence relating inequality and redistributive politics.
These models achieve this result showing the existence of multiple equilib-
ria: a Europe type equilibrium characterized by relatively lower inequality
and higher redistribution versus a US type equilibrium characterized by
relatively higher inequality and lower redistribution. The model of Ben-
abou (2000) is a seminal model which arrives to such conclusions. In the
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model of Benabou (2000) the prevailing level of redistribution is still a vot-
ing outcome, but unlike in the previously mentioned models the relation-
ship between inequality and redistribution is not monotonic. Other the-
oretical models which obtain multiple equilibria with similar features are
those of Saint-Paul (2001) and Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora, Storesletten, and
Zilibotti (2003). Despite the fact that in the model of Benabou (2000) skills
evolve stochastically across generations, every generation exerts effort be-
fore knowing the realization of ability and because of the same prior on the
value of abilities, at each period all individuals exert the same value of ef-
fort. Therefore in the model there are no dynasties which remain stuck in
poverty and the model cannot give insights about the dynamics of mobility.
(iii) Models which focus on the role of beliefs. Starting from the evidence
that the beliefs held by people about the underlying determinants of indi-
vidual wealth and social mobility appear to be strong determinants of the
social contract, the theoretical contributions of Piketty (1995), Alesina and
Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) have developed insightful
models describing how individual beliefs can shape politico-economic out-
comes and viceversa and howmultiple equilibria (US-type vs Europe-type)
are possible. These models with beliefs can explain how beliefs affect redis-
tribution and effort choices in static set-ups, but not how beliefs can affect
intergenerational inequality and mobility.2
2The paper of Alesina andAngeletos (2005) contains a dynamic version of the mainmodel.
In this dynamic version skills are fixed and permanently different across generations. For
this reason the model can show how beliefs can persist and societies can remain stuck in
different equilibria as a result of different initial conditions, but the model cannot give
insights about mobility. Also the model of Piketty (1995) is dynamic, but does not allow
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In the model that I present in this chapter the amount of wealth left
as bequest enter in the utility function of the parents as in the model of
Atkinson (1980). This is a convenient formalization that I take from Alesina
and Angeletos (2005) and which simplifies the dynamic problem to a great
extent because it implies that every generation only wants to maximize
present wealth and avoids issues of inter-temporal optimization and dy-
namic voting. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to build a dynamic model
with bequests, stochastic skills, endogenous voting and endogenous infor-
mation. Stochastic skills are an important ingredient to study mobility and
to allow for incomplete information about the determinants of wealth but
will imply main technical problems which I will discuss. Given those tech-
nical issues, I present to the full model by steps. Section 3.3 analyzes the
case of exogenous political outcome and exogenous information, section
3.4 introduces voting but maintains information exogenous, section 3.5 al-
lows for voting and endogenous information.
3.2. Set Up with Bequests
I consider an economy populated by a continuum of non-overlapping
generations i ∈ [0, 1]. Each generation (or agent) lives for one period t and
is labeled by it. Each generation it produces output y
i
t with the following
for intergenerational transfers. The dynamic aspect only concerns the learning about the
determinants of wealth. The model can give insights about the beliefs on mobility but not
about the actual mobility process.
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technology:
(3.1) yit = θ
i
te
i
t + k
i
t−1,
where kit−1 represents the bequest or other parental investment received by
the previous generation, eit is the effort implemented by generation it and
θit is the return to effort or productivity. With respect to abilities, I consider
both the case in which abilities are i.i.d across different dynasties i but per-
sistent over the life of a dynasty (θit = θ
i) and the more interesting case that
θit is random and i.i.d. across i and t. As standard in this literature, agents
face the linear tax/redistribution scheme introduced by Romer (1975). The
individual budget constraint is given by
(3.2) cit + k
i
t = w
i
t = (1− τt)yit + τty¯t,
where cit denotes own consumption, k
i
t is the bequest left to the next gener-
ation, wit denotes disposable wealth, τt is the tax rate, τty¯t is the lump-sum
transfer and y¯t is the mean output in generation t. In each period t the tim-
ing of the actions follows the model of chapter 2. Each agent votes for the
tax rate τt and exerts effort after that the tax rate is announced. Individuals
receive neat wealth according to (3.2) and then decide how much to con-
sume and to leave in bequests out of it. The private utility of each agent is
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given by the following function:
(3.3) uit(c
i
t, k
i
t, e
i
t) =
1
(1− α)1−ααα (c
i
t)
1−α(kit)
α − be
i2
t
2
.
The first term in (3.3) represents the utility from own consumption and
bequests, whereas the second term is the disutility of effort.
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas aggregator over consumption and bequests
with α ∈ (0, 1), together with the constant 1
(1−α)1−ααα
implies that α ∈ (0, 1)
denotes the fraction of wealth allocated to bequests and maintains the dy-
namic problem very tractable. Agent it chooses consumption, bequest and
effort (cit, k
i
t, e
i
t) so as to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint,
taking the political outcome (τt) as given. It follows that the optimal indi-
vidual consumption and bequest are respectively
(3.4) cit = (1− α)wit
and
(3.5) kit = αw
i
t.
The indirect utility function in terms of wealth thus reduces to
(3.6) uit = w
i
t −
bei
2
t
2
,
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which is exactly the same utility function as in chapter 2. Given that the
objective is the same as in chapter 2 the solutions to the problems of voting
and choosing effort will be the same. This set up allows to avoid inter-
temporal optimization and problems of dynamic voting.
3.3. Step 1: exogenous tax rate and exogenous information.
In this first version of the model I maintain two assumptions: (i) I ab-
stract from voting over τ considering this political outcome to be exoge-
nously determined and constant over time (τt = τ ), (ii) I consider the case
that each individual i is fully informed about the value of θi. This section
shows results which are already known by the previous literature but it is
important for building the rest of the analysis.
Plugging the expression for pre-tax wealth (3.1) into the utility function
(3.6) and solving the f.o.c. I find the expression for the individual optimal
effort:
(3.7) eit = (1− τt)θit/b.
Plugging the expression for optimal effort (3.7) and the expression for pre-
tax wealth (3.1) into the individual budget constraint (3.2) I find the law of
motion of bequests:
(3.8) kit+1 = α
(
(1− τ)kit + (1− τ)2θi
2
t /b+ τ k¯t + τ(1− τ)θ¯2t /b
)
,
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which determines also the law of motion of wealth given (3.5). In the case
in which abilities are i.i.d. across different dynasties but constant over the
life of a dynasty i (θit = θ
i), the law of motion (3.8) describes a convergent
auto-regressive process.3 It is immediate to derive the steady-state bequest
of dynasty i
(3.9) ki =
α((1− τ)2θi2/b+ τ(1− τ)θ¯2/b+ τ k¯)
1− α(1− τ)
and the steady-state mean (or aggregate) bequest
(3.10) k¯ =
α(1− τ)θ¯2
b(1− α) .
Not surprisingly, given that the only source of heterogeneity is in the abil-
ities θi, expression (3.9) shows that the greater is θi and the greater is the
steady-state wealth. It is also obvious that redistribution has an equalizing
effect. From (3.9) and (3.10) it can be computed that the difference between
mean and individual i bequest equals
(3.11) k¯ − ki = α(1− τ)
2(θ¯2 − θi2)
b(1− α(1− τ))
and decreases in the tax rate τ . At the same time expression (3.10) shows
that redistribution diminishes aggregate bequest and hence aggregate wealth.
3The process is convergent as the coefficient of kit is α(1− τ) < 1 and the rest of expression
(3.8) is constant.
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This trade-off between redistribution and growth is due to the fact that in-
dividual effort (3.7) decreases in the tax rate and redistribution has no other
effect on output4.
In order to have somemore insights about the intergenerational dynam-
ics of inequality and mobility it is interesting to explore the case that abili-
ties are not persistent over the life of a dynasty. Assuming that abilities are
drawn at random for each generation t and that θi
2
t = θ¯
2 + ǫit, where ǫ
i
t is
an i.i.d. error term across i and t, with 0 mean, variance equal to σ2 and
zero serial correlation, the law of motion (3.8) still describes a convergent
auto-regressive process.5 The steady state mean bequest is still given by
expression (3.10) and the variance is equal to
(3.12) var(ki) =
α2(1− τ)4σ2
b2(1− α2(1− τ)2) .
As in the case with persistent abilities, increasing the rate of redistribution
reduces inequality across agents.6
Thismodel predicts convergency to a steady state value of wealth which
does not depend on the initial level of wealth. The version with persistent
abilities is qualitatively very similar to the seminal model of Stiglitz (1969)
4This is due to the linear production function and it is different from other models (re-
viewed in the introduction) with concave production functions, where redistribution can
improve the efficiency of the inputs’ allocations and hence increase output.
5In order to prove convergency, it is enough to cite the result of Hellwig (1980) which
applies to Markov processes of this type.
6It is easy to compute that expression (3.12) monotonically decreases in τ . d(var(ki))/dτ =
α2σ2
b2
[
−4(1−τ)3(1−α2(1−τ)2)−2α2(1−τ)5
(1−α2(1−τ)2)2
]
< 0, given τ < 1.
3.3. STEP 1: EXOGENOUS TAX RATE AND EXOGENOUS INFORMATION. 110
which is widely known for a Solow-type convergency in the context of in-
dividual wealth. Stiglitz (1969) model shows that with a concave saving
function – in this case bequest function – if abilities are identical for ev-
erybody, everybody will converge to the same wealth, regardless of the
amount of initial wealth. With heterogenous abilities, inequality is driven
by abilities but once again initial wealth inequality does not matter in the
long run.7 Plugging the expression of optimal effort (3.7) and the expression
of pre-tax wealth (3.1) into the utility function (3.6) gives the expression for
expected utility as a function of the tax rate τ :
(3.13) u¯ = y¯ − ce¯
2
2
= k¯ +
(1− τ 2)θ¯2
2b
.
As in the analysis of chapter 2, expected utility is maximized by a zero tax
rate. The reason is that the utility function is linear in wealth and therefore
there are no ex-ante gains from redistribution; on the other hand effort and
output decrease in the tax rate.
Case of incomplete information.
In order to build the analysis of the next sections, it is useful to analyze
the case in which agents have incomplete information and expect to be of
7A detailed analysis of the results of Stiglitz (1969) in the context of intergenerational trans-
mission of wealth is done contained in the review of Piketty (1998); Piketty (1998) explains
that, as shown by Bourguignon (1981), in the case of convex bequest function the result
about convergency does not generally hold. Other causes that can imply non convergency
are different fertility behaviours across households and credit market imperfections. He
also discusses the case of random abilities.
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average ability θ¯. In this case optimal effort is equal to
(3.14) eit = (1− τt)θ¯/b.
Plugging this expression and the expression for pre-tax wealth (3.1) into the
individual budget constraint (3.2) gives the law of motion of bequest:
(3.15) kit+1 = α
(
(1− τ)kit + (1− τ)2(θ¯)2/b+ τ k¯t + τ(1− τ)(θ¯)2/b
)
.
The steady-state individual bequest, mean bequest and variance follow:
(3.16) ki =
α((1− τ)2θ¯θi/b+ τ(1− τ)(θ¯)2/b+ τ k¯)
1− α(1− τ) ,
(3.17) k¯ =
α(1− τ)(θ¯)2
b(1− α) ,
(3.18) var(k) =
(1− τ)4σ2
b2(1− α2(1− τ)2) .
Given that θ¯2 > (θ¯)2, the mean wealth with complete information (3.10) is
strictly greater than the mean wealth under incomplete information (3.17).
As explained in chapter 2 information improves the efficiency of effort al-
locations and increases output. The same beneficial effect of information
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appears by comparing the expression of expected utility in the case of com-
plete information (3.13) with the respective expression in the case of incom-
plete information:
(3.19) u¯ = k¯ +
(1− τ 2)(θ¯)2
2b
.
From (3.16) and (3.17) it can be computed that under incomplete infor-
mation the difference between mean and individual equals
(3.20) k¯ − ki = α(1− τ)
2θ¯(θ¯ − θi)
b(1− α(1− τ))
and decreases in the tax rate τ .
It is easy to notice that the steady state with incomplete information
is characterized by lower inequality than the steady state with incomplete
information, as the difference between expression (3.11) and (3.20) is equal
to α(1−τ)2(1−π)(θH−θL)(πθH+(1−π)θL)b(1− α(1− τ))which is a positive
term given τ < 1.
3.4. Step 2: endogenous tax rate and exogenous information.
The second step of the analysis is to introduce voting. Being the util-
ity function (3.6) identical to utility function (2.10) of chapter 2, the voting
problem and its solution at each t is also identical. Agents vote for the tax
rate before exerting effort; solving backward I find the objective function of
voter it by plugging the expression of optimal effort (3.7) and the expres-
sion of net wealth (3.2) into the utility function (3.6) and then maximizing
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the obtained expression with respect to τ . As shown in the analysis of chap-
ter 2, each voter imaximizes the following indirect utility function in τ :
(3.21) uit = τ(k
i
t − k¯) + (1− τ)2θi
2
/b+ τ(1− τ)θ¯2/b− (1− τ)2θi2/2b.
Assuming for themoment that the second derivative of expression (3.21)
with respect to τ is strictly negative, the first order condition gives the ideal
tax rate of voter i:
(3.22) τ it (k
i
t, θ
i) = 1− 1 +
b(kit−k¯t)
θ¯2
2− θi2
θ¯2
.
Both the numerator and the denominator of (3.22) show that the gains from
redistribution are traded off the moral hazard effect of taxation. I introduce
the following assumption in order to assure the concavity of the objective
function (2.18) and therefore in order to use the median voter theorem:
Assumption 3.1: 2θ2L > θ
2
H .
A proposition follows:
PROPOSITION 3.1. The individual preferences for taxation are single-peaked
and the individual ideal tax rate is given by expression (3.22).
PROOF. The second derivative of the objective function (3.21) is given
by the following expression:
d2uit
dτ
=
(θi)2 − 2θ¯2
b
.
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The condition stated by assumption 3.1 is sufficient for (3.23) to be strictly
negative as the maximum value that (θi)2 can take is θ2H and the minimum
value that 2θ¯2 can take is 2θ2L. 
Proposition 3.1 shows that preferences over the tax rate are single peaked
and therefore the median voter theorem applies. In order to analyze a
steady state of the dynamic model, I look for a steady state such that given
a stationary history τs = τ for all generations s ≤ t−1, then τt = τ is optimal
for generation t.
Persistent abilities across generations. I start with the case in which
abilities are persistent over dynasties, namely θit = θ
i. Consider a station-
ary history τs = τ for all generations s ≤ t−1. For each dynasty i the low of
motion (3.8) implies that the value of the bequest converges to expression
(3.9) and that the mean value converges to expression (3.10). Given persis-
tent abilities (θit = θ
i) and assuming that every dynasty starts life with no
endowment (ki0 = 0 for all i), in every period t the median and prevailing
tax rate τt is that one of the dynasty with median ability θ
m. Plugging the
expressions of the steady state median bequest km (obtained through (3.9)
) and of the steady state mean bequest (3.10) into the expression for the in-
dividual ideal tax rate (3.22) and using (3.11), I find the tax rate τt which
follows a given stationary history:
(3.23) τt =
θ¯2 − θm2 + α(1−τ)2(θ¯2−θm
2
)
1−α(1−τ)
2θ¯2 − θm2 .
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This expression is decreasing in τ , hence there is a unique fixed point.
This result of a unique steady state is found also by Alesina and Angeletos
(2005). It is the standard result of Meltzer and Richard (1981) in a dynamic
context. Redistribution is driven by the difference between mean and me-
dian wealth and this is the case in every period. The dynamic implication
is that present redistribution depends on the history of past redistributive
outcomes and more precisely the tax rate declines over time.8
Random abilities across generations. I explore the case of random abil-
ities. As I have done in the previous section with exogenous voting I as-
sume that abilities are drawn at random for each generation and that θi
2
t =
θ¯2 + ǫit, where ǫ
i
t is i.i.d. across i and t with mean = 0 and variance equal to
σ2. Considering a stationary history τs = τ for all generations s ≤ t− 1, the
law of motion (3.8) implies that the mean bequest converges to expression
(3.10) and that the variance is equal to expression (3.12).
In general, it is complicated to identify the median voter at time t be-
cause this depends on both the distributions of k and θ. To see this take ex-
pression (3.22) and re-express it as τ it (k
i
t, θ
i
t) =
θ¯2−θi2+b(kit−k¯t)
2θ¯2−θi2
. This shows that
the distribution of τ it is given by the ratio of two distributions, respectively
the numerator and the denominator of expression (3.22). Take for example
the case in which ǫit is normally distributed and each generation starts with
8The same result is also found by Bertocchi (2007) in a model which specifically analyzes
the evolution of bequest taxation over time.
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no endowment at time 0 (ki0 = 0 for all i). In this case both k
i and θi are nor-
mally distributed at time t and the distribution of τ it (k
i
t, θ
i
t) =
θ¯2−θi2+b(kit−k¯t)
2θ¯2−θi2
,
is given by the ratio of two normal distributions. It is quite complicated to
identify such ratio distribution where the two normal variables have dif-
ferent means and to find the median.9 This difficulty to deal with dynamic
models of voting in which abilities change over time has been recognized
in the literature.10
Random abilities across generations and incomplete information. In
order to skip this technical issue it is useful to consider the case of incom-
plete information in which everyone expects to be of average ability θ¯. In
this case the ideal tax rate of each individual i is given by expression (3.22)
once that θi2 and θ¯2 are replaced by (θ¯)2, obtaining
(3.24) τ i(ki, θ¯) =
b(kit − k¯t)
(θ¯)2
.
Given that the distribution of the ideal tax rates only depends on the distri-
bution of ki it is immediate to identify the median voter to be the voter with
median endowment km. I consider two specific distributions as examples.
9A technical analysis of the properties of this type of ratio distribution is done by Hinkley
(1969).
10Tomy knowledge, the only dynamic model of voting in which abilities change over time
is the one of Persson and Tabellini. (1991), but in this paper there is no identification of
the median voter in a steady state. In the published version of the paper (Persson and
Tabellini (1994)) it is only considered the case of persistent abilities. All the other papers in
the literature only consider the case of persistent abilities: Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Das
and Ghate (2004), Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2003), Saint-Paul
(2001), Bertocchi (2007).
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Example 1: binomial distribution of abilities. In every period each
individual i has ability θL with probability π and ability θH with probability
1−π and I assume that every dynasty starts life with no endowment (ki0 = 0
for all i). Given a stationary history, the distribution of k will converge to
a normal distribution, because the distribution of k comes from repeated
independent Bernuolli trials over ability realizations and the distribution
of those realizations converges to a normal distribution. The fact that the
distribution of k converges to the normal implies that at time t the median
and the mean endowment coincide and therefore that τt = 0. Thus in the
case of binomial distribution of abilities there is a unique steady-state with
zero tax. This is again a case in which inequality progressively decreases.
Being the steady state with zero tax, there is convergency to the same steady
state as in a model without redistribution. On the other hand taxation may
increase the speed of convergency.11
Example 2: Log-Normal distribution of abilities. I consider the case
in which θi
2
t = θ¯
2 + ǫit, with ǫ
i
t i.i.d for all i and t and log-normally dis-
tributed. I also assume that in period 0 everyone starts life with no endow-
ment, ki0 = 0 for all i. Given that agents have incomplete information about
θi and believe to be of average ability θ¯, a stationary history is still speci-
fied by expressions (3.15), (3.17), (3.18) and k is log-normally distributed in
every period. Using the properties of the log-normal distribution, given k¯
and var(ki), the steady state median bequest is equal to km = k¯
2√
k¯2+var(ki)
.
11Also this point has been early discussed by Stiglitz (1969)
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Given such stationary history, the voted tax rate at time t is still given by
τt =
b(k¯(τ)−km(τ))
θ¯2
. The difference k¯−km decreases in τ , hence also in this case
there is a unique fixed point. Noticing that km decreases in var(ki), there-
fore the greater it is the underlying inequality σ and the greater it is the
steady state level of redistribution τ . I can solve for τt = τ and character-
ize the steady state. Given that the distribution is skewed to the right, the
steady state level of redistribution can be different from zero, for example
the computations for the case of α = 0.2, b = 1, θ¯2 = 1, σ2 = 2 imply that
τ = 0.17.
3.5. Step 3: endogenous tax rate and endogenous information.
The previous section clarified the difficulties implied by the introduc-
tion of voting in a model with heterogenous abilities. Using the set up of
chapter 2, in this section I allow for varying levels of information in the
present dynamic model with bequests and I consider the level of informa-
tion as an endogenous variable in the economy. The main contribution is to
shed some light on the technical difficulties which are implied. The main
technical problem with varying levels of information is still represented by
the identification of the median voter. The individual ideal tax rate is deter-
mined by the individual value of wealth and the expected ability. A steady
state with endogenous information must have the feature that the level of
information is optimal. In order to check for this it is necessary to verify
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that there are no gains in changing the level of information. This is diffi-
cult because changing the level of information changes expectations, hence
changes the distribution of ideal tax rates and such change is difficult to
address. I provide a numerical examples with multiple politico economic
equilibria. In this example both complete information (λ = 1) and min-
imum information (λ = 1/2) are optimal; the two equilibria have differ-
ent macroeconomic features and can be interpreted as Europe-type versus
American-type equilibria.
3.5.1. Set up with varying information. Each generation it has ability
θL with probability π and ability θH with probability 1− π, for all i and t. I
maintain the assumption that π > 1/2. In each period t each agent i cannot
observe her own or other agents’ productivity but only receives a private
signal σit about the true value of θ
i
t. Also the signal σ
i
t is binary. If θ
i
t = θL
(θit = θH), σ
i
t takes values σL (σH ) or σH (σL), respectively with probability
λt and 1−λt. In other words for each agent it the signal σit is independently
distributed, it is truthful with probability λt, false with probability 1−λt and
the transition matrix which takes from the true productivity to the signal is
the following:
(3.25) T




σL
σH


∣∣∣ [θL, θH ]

 =


λt 1− λt
1− λt λt

 .
Agent’s i belief of the true value of θit, conditional on the observation of the
private signal σit, is obtained by the Bayes Rule. I introduce the following
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notation:
(3.26) µit ≡ Pr[θit = θL|σit],
represents agent it belief that θ
i
t = θL conditional on the observation of
signal σit . From the Bayes rule it follows that:
(3.27) µtσL ≡ (µit|σL) =
πλt
πλt + (1− π)(1− λt)
and
(3.28) µtσH ≡ (µit|σH) =
π(1− λt)
π(1− λt) + λt(1− π) .
The expected value of θit conditional on the observation of σ
i
t is given by the
following expression:
(3.29) θ(µit) ≡ µitθL + (1− µit)θH .
Given the symmetric structure of (2.2) I consider the interval λt ∈ [1/2, 1],
for all t. For λt = 1/2 the signal σ
i
t is completely uninformative and the pos-
terior belief is equal to the prior, i.e. µtσL=µtσH=π. Increasing λt makes the
signal progressively more informative up to the point that λt = 1 and the
signal is perfectly informative with µtσL = 1, µtσH = 0. As already explained
in the previous chapter, the value of λ represents the level of information
in the economy and in a rather abstract way I consider it is an institutional
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feature and a policy variable. The ex-ante probability of observing σL for
each generation alive at t is given by the following expression:
(3.30) pσLt ≡ Pr[σit = σL] = λtπ + (1− λt)(1− π),
symmetrically
(3.31) pσHt ≡ Pr[σit = σH ] = λt(1− π) + π(1− λt) = 1− ptσL
represents the probability of observing σH . Over-lined variables stand for
mean values for the population, hence y¯ and e¯ are respectively the mean, or
aggregate, values of output and effort and
θ ≡ πθL + (1− π)θH ,
θ2 ≡ πθ2L + (1− π)θ2H ,
are respectively the mean values of productivity and squared productivity.
The timing of the model is such that each individual iwho is alive at time t
starts life receiving a signal σit and being aware of the level of precision λt.
The game proceeds as before: agents vote on tax, exert effort, receive net
wealth, consume and leave bequests. The last action of the agents alive at
t is to collectively decide the level of information for the offspring, namely
λt+1. I assume that the future level of information λt+1 is determined by
majority voting.
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In the case in which abilities are random in each period t I would face
the technical difficulties implied by the determination of the median voter
which I explained in section 3.4. In order to keep the model tractable I
restrict the analysis to the case of persistent abilities and I assume that
there are only two dynasties: the low ability dynasty with ability θL in
each period t and the high dynasty with ability θH in each period t, respec-
tively a fraction π and 1− π of the population. Nevertheless agents ignore
completely the persistence of abilities and they “falsely”believe their prior:
namely that in each period t abilities are i.i.d across agents and agents are
of type θL with probability π and of type θH with probability 1− π in each
period t. As explained before, on top of this prior, agents receive a signal
about their ability. I stress the fact that the assumption that abilities are per-
sistent and agents ignore this fact is very strong and it is not done for sake
of realism but exclusively to maintain the model tractable. 12 Nevertheless
the main result of existence of multiple optimal levels of information and
multiple steady-states is not driven by this assumption.
3.5.2. Politico Economic Equilibrium with perfect information. Given
a stationary history s ≤ t − 1 such that the voted tax rate is always τs = τ
and the voted information is always full information λs+1 = 1, I describe
a steady state such that at time t, the voted tax rate is still τt = τ and the
12It is clear that the existence of bequests would imply that at some point agents learn that
abilities are persistent. This because in each period t agents would either belong to a group
who received either the low or the high level of bequests. Therefore for the prior not to be
updated across generations it should be also the case that agents should ignore or forget
what happened to the previous generations.
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voted information is still λt+1 = 1. Given a stationary history τs = τ and
λs+1 = 1 for s ≤ t − 1, at time t the bequest for dynasty L (H) converges
to the steady state value kL (kH) given by (3.9) and the mean bequest con-
verges to the steady state value (3.10). Given the history with persistent
abilities and perfect information, at time t there are two groups of voters,
respectively with preferred tax rates τ(kL, θL) and τ(kH , θH) given by ex-
pression (3.22). The prevailing tax rate at time t is τt = τ(kL, θL), because
π > 1/2 implies that the majority of the population belongs to the dynasty
with low ability and low endowment. In a steady state it must be the case
that τt = τ and that the bequest that agents with endowments kL (kH) leave
for the t+ 1 offsprings is still kL (kH).
3.5.3. Politico Economic Equilibrium with incomplete information.
Given a stationary history s ≤ t − 1 such that the voted tax rate is al-
ways τs = τ and the voted level of information is always the minimum
λs+1 = 1/2, I describe a steady state such that at time t, the voted tax rate is
still τt = τ and the voted information is still λt+1 = 1/2. Given a stationary
history τs = τ and λs+1 = 1/2 for s ≤ t − 1, at time t the bequest for dy-
nasty L (H) converges to the steady state value kL (kH) given by (3.16) and
the mean bequest converges to the steady state value (3.17). Given the his-
tory with persistent abilities and perfect information, at time t there are two
groups of voters, respectively with preferred tax rates τ(kL, θ¯) and τ(kH , θ¯)
given by expression (3.24). The prevailing tax rate at time t is τt = τ(kL, θ¯),
because π > 1/2 implies that the majority of the population belongs to the
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dynasty with low ability and low endowment. In a steady state it must be
the case that τt = τ and that the bequest that agents with endowments kL
(kH) leave for the t+ 1 offsprings is still kL (kH).
3.5.4. Solution of the individual problem. In addition to leaving be-
quests, at time t agents decide by majority voting the future information
λt+1. Each agent it votes on λt+1 in order to maximize the utility of the off-
spring it+1. In order to find the utility of an offspring as a function of λt+1
it is necessary to solve backwards the choices of effort and voting of the
agents alive at t + 1. Conditional on the signal, the expected utility that
the generations who are alive at time tmaximize when they vote and exert
effort is the following:
(3.32) E[uit|σit] =
E[(1− τt)(kit + eitθit) + τt(k¯t + etθt)− b(eit)2/2|σit].
Solving the sufficient first order condition, the optimal level of effort ex-
erted by individual i is
(3.33) eit = (1− τt)θ(µit)/b.
By backward induction, I can plug (3.33) into (3.32) and find the objective
function that i maximizes when voting for the tax rate. In order to do this,
3.5. STEP 3: ENDOGENOUS TAX RATE AND ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION. 125
it is useful to specify the individual i expectation of the output from effort:
(3.34) E[eitθ
i
t|σit] = (1− τt) (θ(µt))2 /b
and of squared effort
(3.35) E[(eit)
2|σit] = (eit)2 =
(
1− τt
a
)2
θ(µt)
2.
In computing the mean (aggregate) product of effort eθ, each agent i knows
that that a fraction π (1−π) of the agents have productivity θL (θH ) and that
among those a fraction λ chooses the optimal effort after the observation
of σL (σH), whereas a fraction 1− λ chooses the optimal effort after the ob-
servation of σH (σL). Therefore the individual expectation of the aggregate
output from effort is given by the following expression:
(3.36) E[etθt|σit] = (1− τt)Γ/b,
where I define
(3.37) Γ ≡ πθL (λθ(µσL) + (1− λ)θ(µσH ))+
(1− π)θH ((1− λ)θ(µσL) + λθ(µσH )) .
Collecting θ(µσL) and θ(µσH ) it is easy to re-write expression (3.41) as
(3.38) Γ = pσLθ(µσL)
2 + (1− pσL)θ(µσH )2.
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The term Γ is the expression for aggregate output from effort, net of the
distortive effect of redistribution on effort. It will be shown that will play
a crucial role in the analysis. Plugging (3.34), (3.35) and (3.41) into (3.32), I
obtain an indirect form of (3.32) as a function of τt:
(3.39)
uit(τt, µ
i
t) = τt(k
i
t − k¯t) + (1− τt)2θ(µit)2/b+ τt(1− τt)Γ/b− (1− τt)2θ(µit)2/2b.
This is the object that voter it maximizes voting over the tax rate τt. As-
suming for the moment that the second derivative of the obtained indirect
utility in τ is strictly negative, the first order condition gives the ideal tax
rate of voter i:
(3.40) τ(kit, µ
i
t) = 1−
1 +
b(kit−k¯t)
Γ
2− θ(µit)2
Γ
,
where
(3.41) Γ ≡ πθL (λθ(µσL) + (1− λ)θ(µσH ))+
(1− π)θH ((1− λ)θ(µσL) + λθ(µσH )) .
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As already explained in the previous chapter, the numerator of (3.40) shows
that the gains from redistribution are traded off the distortive effect of redis-
tribution and the denominator of (3.40) shows how the subjective prospects
of upward mobility reduce the desired tax rate.13
PROPOSITION 3.2. The individual preferences for taxation are single peaked
and the individual ideal tax rate is given by expression (3.40) .
PROOF. The second derivative of the objective function in problem (2.18)
is given by the following expression:
d2ui1
dτ
= −2Γ+θ(µ)
2
b
. The condition stated
by Assumption 2.1 is sufficient for this expression to be strictly negative as
the maximum value that θ(µ)2 can take is θ2H and the minimum value that
2Γ can take is 2θ2L. 
Proposition 3.2 shows that preferences over the tax rate are single peaked
and therefore the median voter theorem applies. Plugging (3.33) into (3.32)
and taking expectations conditional on the information at time t, I obtain
generation it expectation of generation it+1 utility:
(3.42) Eit [u
i
t+1] = τt+1(k¯ − ki) + (1− (τt+1)2)Γt+1/2b.
I model the collective choice of λt+1 as a choice by majority voting. Given
that the agents with kL are the majority, their choice of λt+1 will determine
the prevailing one. Therefore for a specific level of information λ′ to be part
13The term θ(µ
i)2
Γ represents the subjective prospects of upward mobility as it is equal to
the the ratio of individual output (3.34) over aggregate output (3.36), noticing that the term
1−τ
a
gets canceled out.
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of an equilibrium it is necessary that λ′ is the arg max {τt+1(k¯ − kL) + (1 −
(τt+1)
2)Γ/2b.} In order to check for this it is necessary to know how τt+1
changes in λ. At time t+1 there are four groups of voters, respectively with
preferred tax rates τ(kL, θσL), τ(kH , θσL), τ(kL, θσH ), τ(kH , θσH ). I claim that
in this case of π > 1/2 the prevailing tax rate under majority voting is either
τ(kL, θσL), or the greater between τ(kH , θσL) and τ(kL, θσH ), depending on
the value of λ. This claim can be easily proved. The fraction of agents who
prefer τ(kL, θσL) is equal to πpσL , where pσL is given by (3.30). When λ = 1
the fraction π of agents with endowment kL knows to be of type θL. In
the case in which π > 1/2, this implies that they are the majority group
and impose their favorite tax rate. Decreasing λ implies that agents can
have two types of beliefs, namely θσL and θσH , and there are four group of
voters, respectively with preferred tax rates τ(kL, θσL), τ(kH , θσL), τ(kL, θσH ),
τ(kH , θσH ). Decreasing λ implies that πpσL decreases. There is a value λ
∗ ∈
(1/2, 1) such that πpσL = 1/2, namely λ
∗ = −2pi+2pi
2+1
2pi(2pi−1)
. For λ ∈ [1/2, λ∗) it
happens that the group which prefers τ(kL, θσL) is not the majority group,
and the pivotal group will be either τ(kH , θσL) or τ(kL, θσH ) depending on
which is the greater tax rate of the two. This is because in the case in which
τ(kH , θσL) ≥ τ(kL, θσH ), then it is the case that the total ranking of tax rates
is τ(kL, θσL) > τ(kH , θσL) ≥ τ(kL, θσH ) and the fact that the fraction pσL of
agents with belief θσL is greater than 1/2 (this because π > 1/2 and λ > 1/2)
implies that the median voter must belong to the group with τ(kH , θσL).
Otherwise in the case in which τ(kL, θσH ) ≥ τ(kH , θσL), it is the case that the
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total ranking of tax rates is τ(kL, θσL) > τ(kL, θσH ) ≥ τ(kH , θσL) and the fact
that the fraction of agents with kL is greater than 1/2 (this because π > 1/2)
implies that the median voter must belong to the group with τ(kL, θσH ).
3.5.5. Example of multiple politico-economic equilibria. I consider the
following numerical example: θL = 1, θH = 1.5, π = 0.7, α = 0.2, b = 1. I
first consider the case of complete information λ = 1. Evaluating kL, k¯ and
τt for the given values and solving for τt = τ with I obtain that τ = 0.243. I
plug this value back into expressions (3.9) and (3.10) and I find the steady
state values kL = 0.209 and k¯ = 0.26. The majority of the agents at time t
have endowment kL. Under majority voting, they determine λt+1 in order
to maximize the expected welfare of their offspring:
(3.43) uL = τt+1(k¯ − kL) + (1− (τt+1)2)Γ/2.
If πpσL ≥ 1/2 then the prevailing tax rate at t+ 1 is τ = τ(kL, θ(µσL)). Given
π = 0.7 and using the definition of pσLt+1 = πλt+1+(1−π)(1−λt+1), πpσLt+1 ≥
1/2 for λt+1 ≥ 1.03, therefore it is never the case that τ(kL, θ(µσL)) is the
pivotal. The prevailing tax rate is the greater one between τ(kL, θ(µσH))
and τ(kH , θ(µσL)). I plot both those two tax rates, respectively in figure 3.1
and 3.2.
Computations show that they equal each other for 0.584. Hence in the
considered interval τ(kL, µσH ) is greater and it is the prevailing tax rate.
It is also important to notice that τ(kL, µσH) ≤ 0, for λ ≥ 0.55 and that
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FIGURE 3.1. τ(kL, µσH ) for π = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, b = 1,
α = 0.2.
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FIGURE 3.2. τ(kH , µσL) for π = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, b = 1,
α = 0.2.
τ(kH , µσL) ≤ 0, for λ ≤ 0.63. Therefore I consider τ = 0 in the interval
λ ∈ [0.55, 0.63]. I plot the objective function (3.43) in figure 3.3, where
3.5. STEP 3: ENDOGENOUS TAX RATE AND ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION. 131
τt+1 = τ(kL, µσH ) for λt+1 ∈ [0.5, 0.55], τt+1 = 0 for λt+1 ∈ [0.55, 0.63],
τt+1 = τ(kH , µσL) for λt+1 ∈ [0.63, 1]. λt+1 = 1 is a global maximum.
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FIGURE 3.3. Objective function (3.43) for π = 0.7, θL = 1,
θH = 1.5, b = 1, α = 0.2.
I now consider the case of completely uninformative signals λ = 1/2.
Given a stationary history s ≤ t − 1 such that the voted tax rate is τs =
τ and the voted information is the minimum information λs+1 = 1/2, I
describe a steady state such that at time t, the voted tax rate is still τt = τ
and the voted information is still λt+1 = 1/2. Given a stationary history
τs = τ and λs+1 = 1/2 for s ≤ t − 1, at time t the bequest for dynasty
L (H) converges to the steady state value kL (kH) given by (3.16) and the
mean bequest converges to the steady state value (3.17). Given the history
with persistent abilities and minimum information, at time t there are two
groups of voters, respectively with preferred tax rates τ(kL, θ¯) and τ(kH , θ¯)
given by expression (3.22). The prevailing tax rate at time t is τt = τ(kL, θ¯),
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because π > 1/2 implies that the majority of the population belongs to the
dynasty with low ability and low endowment. In a steady state it must be
the case that τt = τ and that the bequest that agents with endowments kL
(kH) leave for the t + 1 offsprings is still kL (kH). Following the previous
example for λ = 1/2 to be part of a steady state it is necessary that λ = 1/2
is the arg max expression (3.43).
I consider the same numerical example: θL = 1, θH = 1.5, π = 0.7, α =
0.2, b = 1. Evaluating kL, k¯ and τt for the given values and solving for τt = τ
with Maple I obtain τ = 0.03. I plug this value back into expressions (3.16)
and (3.17) and I find the steady state values kL = 0.28 and k¯ = 0.32. If
πpσLt+1 ≥ 1/2 then the prevailing tax rate at t+1 is τ = τ(kL, θ(µσL)). Given
π = 0.7 and using the definition of pσLt+1 = πλt+1+(1−π)(1−λt+1), πpσLt+1 ≥
1/2 for λt+1 ≥ 1.03, therefore it is never the case that τ(kL, θ(µσL)) is the
pivotal. The prevailing tax rate is the greater one between τ(kL, θ(µσH))
and τ(kH , θ(µσL)). I plot both those two tax rates for λ ∈ [1/2, 1], respec-
tively in figure 3.4 and 3.5. They equal each other for 0.567, therefore the
prevailing tax rate is τ(kL, θ(µσH)) for λ ∈ [0.5, 0.567] and τ(kH , θ(µσL)) for
λ ∈ [0.567, 1]. Hence in the considered interval τ(kL, µH) prevails. It is also
important to notice that τ(kL, µH) ≤ 0, for λ ≥ 0.551, and that τ(kH , µL) ≤ 0,
for λ ≥ 0.6, therefore I consider τ = 0 in the interval λ ∈ [0.567, 0.6]. I
plot the objective function (3.43) in figure 3.3, where τt+1 = τ(kL, µH) for
λt+1 ∈ [0.5, 0.567], τt+1 = 0 for λt+1 ∈ [0.567, 0.6], τt+1 = τ(kH , µL) for
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FIGURE 3.4. τ(kL, µσH ) for π = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, b = 1,
α = 0.2.
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FIGURE 3.5. τ(kH , µσL) for π = 0.7, θL = 1, θH = 1.5, b = 1,
α = 0.2.
λt+1 ∈ [0.6, 1]. λt+1 = 1/2 is a local maximum. 14 The two equilibria can
be further characterized in terms of the other endogenous outcomes.
14Therefore with a linear cost of changing information C(λ′ − 1/2) greater than the slope
of the line connecting the welfare function at λ = 1/2 and at λ = 1 it is an equilibrium, as
shown in figure 3.6.
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FIGURE 3.6. Objective function (3.43) for π = 0.7, θL = 1,
θH = 1.5, b = 1, α = 0.2.
Values of the endogenous variables in the equilibrium with perfect
information.
Wealth of dynasty with low ability before taxes (I label it with the apex B):
wBL = kL + (1− τ)θ2L = 0.965.
Wealth of dynasty with high ability before taxes (I label it with the apex B):
wBH = kH + (1− τ)θ2H = 2.080.
Wealth of dynasty with low ability after taxes: wL = (1−τ)(kL+(1−τ)θ2L)+
τ(k¯ + (1− τ)θ¯2) = 1.047.
Wealth of dynasty with high ability after taxes: wH = (1 − τ)(kH + (1 −
τ)θ2H) + τ(k¯ + (1− τ)θ¯2) = 1.891.
Effort exerted by low ability individuals: eL = (1− τ)θL = 0.757.
Effort exerted by high ability individuals: eH = (1− τ)θH = 1.135.
Aggregate effort: e¯ = (1− τ)θ¯ = 0.870.
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Aggregate output: y¯ = k¯ + (1− τ)θ¯2 = 1.300.
Values of the endogenous variables in the equilibrium with imperfect
information.
Wealth of dynasty with low ability before taxes (I label it with the apex B):
wBL = kL + (1− τ)θLθ¯ = 1.395.
Wealth of dynasty with high ability before taxes (I label it with the apex B):
wBH = kH + (1− τ)θH θ¯ = 2.083.
Wealth of dynasty with low ability after taxes: wL = (1−τ)(kL+(1−τ)θL θ¯)+
τ(k¯ + (1− τ)θ¯2) = 1.401.
Wealth of dynasty with high ability after taxes: wH = (1 − τ)(kH + (1 −
τ)θH θ¯) + τ(k¯ + (1− τ)θ¯2) = 2.069.
Effort exerted by both low and high ability individuals: eL = eH = e¯ =
(1− τ)θ¯ = 1.115.
Aggregate output: y¯ = k¯ + (1− τ)θ¯2 = 1.603.
Interpretation of the result of multiple equilibria. The numerical ex-
ample shows the existence of two equilibria, respectively with complete
(λ = 1) and with minimum (λ = 1/2) information. In this numerical exam-
ple the multiplicity arises because λ = 1 happens to be a global maximum
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and λ = 1/2 is a local maximum.15 In this numerical example the non-
monotonicity of the objective function with respect to the level of informa-
tion which implies the possibility that λ = 1/2 is a local maximum is driven
by the change in the identity of the median voter. In the interval in which
the median voter is the group with preferred tax rate τ(kL, µH) the tax rate
decreases in λ. As figure 3.6 suggests, in this interval this effect dominates
the sign of the derivative of the objective function (3.43) and implies that
in such interval the objective function decreases. Information affects both
τ and Γ. There could be other cases of non monotonicity. For example as
it was the case in the previous chapter, in principle it can still be possible
that over some interval −τ 2 dominates the sign of the derivative and the
objective function decreases in λ, whereas over other intervals Γ dominates
the sign of the derivative and the objective function increases in λ.
3.6. Conclusion
This chapter developed a dynamicmodel with bequests, stochastic skills,
endogenous voting and endogenous information. Given the technical is-
sues involved, I proceeded by steps adding one element at the time. The
intermediate steps showed results already known by the previous litera-
ture but offered a unified a framework. The result of the chapter is to have
taken a first step towards the development of a unifying framework which
15Therefore for λ = 1/2 to be optimal it is necessary to introduce the additional assumption
that there is a cost of increasing the level of information which is large enough. It is worthy
to mention that in the model of Benabou and Tirole (2006) for multiple equilibria to exist
the same assumption is necessary.
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allows to study how beliefs about the determinants of wealth can affect the
dynamics of inequality, mobility and redistribution.
Given the technical difficulties that stochastic skills imply in the deter-
mination of the median voter, I can only characterize equilibria with en-
dogenous information for the case of persistent abilities over the life of dy-
nasties (θit = θ
i). In this case, with a numerical example, I show the pos-
sibility of equilibria with complete (λ = 1) and with minimum (λ = 1/2)
information.
This example essentially shows that societies with similar fundamentals
can find optimal to be permanently “stuck”at different informative struc-
tures. Such different informative structures imply different steady states
in terms of beliefs, redistribution, aggregate effort, aggregate output, sep-
aration of effort choices across individuals and inequality of wealth across
individuals. Why, in this example, does it happen that a society remain
stuck at a particular steady state? In terms of interpretations, the equilibria
of the example describe a society which is characterized by a certain level of
information long enough such that wealth is distributed so that for the ma-
jority group there is no ex-ante gain in changing the information structure.
This happens because that particular level of information maximizes the
welfare of the majority group. Given that in the uninformative equilibrium
of the numerical example λ = 1/2 is a local maximum, the interpretation of
such equilibrium should be that of a society for which the welfare gain in
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increasing the level of information would be off-set by some implied struc-
tural costs of doing so. As explained at the end of the previous section,
it is important to notice that for this to be the case, a necessary condition
is that the welfare function does not increase monotonically in the level of
information.
The analysis of this chapter does not completely characterize the equi-
libria, in the sense that it does not generally show how the economic and
redistributive outcomes of an equilibrium depend on the level of informa-
tion. The numerical example only shows the possibility of equilibria with
complete (λ = 1) and with minimum (λ = 1/2) information. Comparing
the endogenous variables in the two equilibria of the example, the equilib-
rium with λ = 1 is characterized by relatively higher redistribution, greater
inequality before taxes, greater inequality after taxes, more separated levels
of effort, lower aggregate effort and lower aggregate output. Other numer-
ical examples that I tried with different values of the parameters did not
seem to change these features of the two steady states. As it was the case
with the model of the previous chapter, the informative (uninformative)
equilibrium presents Europe-type (US-type) features in terms of redistribu-
tion, aggregate effort and output. At the same time, the feature that the
Europe-type equilibrium is characterized by relatively higher inequality is
not entirely satisfactory because it contradicts some of the empirical evi-
dence.16 This feature that themore informative equilibrium is characterized
16See the discussion in section 1.1.2 of chapter 1.
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by higher inequality is not so surprising given that in the example the unin-
formative equilibrium is characterized by minimum information and levels
of effort which are identical across different types of agents. One would
expect such pooling equilibrium to be associated with low inequality. In
principle it does not have to be the case that more informative equilibria are
always associated with higher inequality. The opposite could happen if in
the more informative equilibrium the higher rate of redistribution distorts
effort so much that the levels of exerted effort are less separated, despite
the fact that beliefs are more separated. Interestingly enough given the al-
ready mentioned empirical evidence about redistribution and inequality, in
such a case the driving force behind higher taxation would not be the actual
level of inequality, even though this would still impact on the ideal tax rate,
but the beliefs about the determinants of wealth. Moreover, in such a case,
the driving force behind the fact that effort levels are less separated in the
Europe-type equilibrium would be the distortive effect of taxation.17
In order to verify this possibility it is necessary to look for equilibria
with interior solutions in terms of information because the extreme cases
do not seem to give that result. Even in the case of persistent abilities,
with interior solutions the identification of the median voter is problem-
atic. Allowing for the case in which abilities evolve stochastically across
generations could give interesting results about the study of mobility and
inequality, because it would be possible to characterize how different levels
17This point seems to have some robust empirical support, see for example Prescott (2004).
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of information impact on effort decisions and taxation and obtain interest-
ing comparative statics. Therefore, given the implied technical issues in the
identification of the median voter, it seems a promising direction for future
research to investigate those issues with numerical methods.
Conclusions of the Thesis
This thesis aimed to contribute to the understanding of the role of collec-
tive beliefs and incomplete information in the analysis of inequality, growth
and redistributive politics. More specifically it aimed to offer insights to an-
swer open questions relating societal beliefs and the level of redistribution:
(i) Why is the case that very different patterns of redistribution and social
contracts are found across countries which are otherwise similar?
(ii) Why is it the case that also the beliefs which people hold about the
underlying determinants of wealth and the extent of social mobility are
very different across otherwise similar societies?
(iii) It appears that the societies which are characterized by the widespread
belief according to which “hard work, self-discipline and other factors un-
der individual control more than luck, family of origin or other factors out-
side individual control determine individual wealth”(e.g. the US) redis-
tribute less than the societies which are characterized by the opposite belief
(e.g. European countries). Is it possible to describe those outcomes relating
beliefs, political and economic outcomes in terms of different equilibria?
And which are the driving forces behind those different outcomes?
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Presenting an extensive review of various strands of literature, chapter
1 motivated why such questions are of great relevance for the understand-
ing of macroeconomic problems. Simplifying the argument to the core,
the existing literature shows the great importance of studying the deter-
minants of redistributive politics as the latter have a major impact on in-
equality and growth. In addition, beliefs seem to influence to a great extent
the shape of redistributive politics and therefore ignoring beliefs means to
forget about an important channel. Models which can originate multiple
equilibria seem to be particularly insightful as they are able to rationalize
the observed economic and political outcomes as endogenous outcomes of
societies which are otherwise equal. The theoretical contributions of Piketty
(1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) have
been the first to develop insightful models describing how individual be-
liefs can shape politico-economic outcomes and viceversa and how multi-
ple equilibria (US-type vs Europe-type) are possible. These models offer
different explanations for the observed outcomes but they all share the fea-
ture that economic agents have incomplete information about the underly-
ing determinants of wealth – i.e. about the role of factors under individ-
ual control versus the role of factors outside individual control. Chapter
2 develops a theoretical model which shares the same underlying features
of these models, but focuses on the sole role of incomplete information –
without adding other elements as psychological factors – and considers the
level of incomplete information in the economy as an institutional feature
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that policies can in principle change. Themodel can generatemultiple equi-
libria with US-type versus Europe-type features. One main contribution is
therefore to show that incomplete information is a driving force behind the
existence of multiple equilibria. Moreover it offers a different economic in-
terpretation of the two equilibria which points to the existence of different
informative cultures and which is supported by evidence from the litera-
ture in education and sociology. Specifically it shows that otherwise simi-
lar societies can find optimal to pearmain at different levels of information,
where relatively more (less) separating informative structures should are
associated to higher (lower) redistribution and lower aggregate output and
effort. My model also wanted to address specific policy questions:
(iv) Given that beliefs and incomplete information appear to play a crucial
role in the determination of political and economy outcomes, which are the
relative policy implications? Is there any role for institutions which can
affect the degree of information in the economy?
This question could not be answered by the existing models. In my
model information is instead considered to be an institutional feature and
it is possible to change the degree of incomplete information in a continu-
ous way. In this way I offer various results in terms of comparative statics
of how individual and aggregate political and economic outcomes change
with degree of incomplete information.
Chapter 3 develops a dynamic version of the model of chapter 2, intro-
ducing the same information set-up in an intergenerational economy with
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bequests and voting. In this way, the chapter develops a dynamic model
with bequests, stochastic skills, endogenous voting and endogenous infor-
mation. The model shows that also in a dynamic setting there can be mul-
tiple optimal welfare maximizing levels of information, and therefore oth-
erwise similar societies can remain “stuck”in steady states with different
levels of information, where relatively more (less) separating informative
structures should are accompanied by higher (lower) redistribution and
lower aggregate output and effort. Given some technical issues which I
extensively discuss, the model is not able to give a general characterization
of the steady states, nevertheless this could be done by numerical methods
and seems to be a promising direction for the analysis of the dynamics of
inequality and intergenerational mobility.
Future research should continue the analysis in the following directions.
My theoretical framework interprets different political and economic out-
comes in otherwise similar societies as driven by different informative cul-
tures/structues. Future empirical research should characterize such differ-
ent informative features. At the theoretical level, it seems interesting to
link my rather abstract information set up with theories focused on how
political groups or other institutions can influence information and beliefs
through education-financing18, propaganda19 or mass media20. The idea
that separation across individuals impacts their information and beliefs
18See references in footnote 10, chapter 1.
19See for example Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001).
20See for example Prat and Stro¨mberg (2005)
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seems also quite related to the models which analyze the role of segregation
or discrimination on inequality.21 Another natural link seems to be with
theoretical models which study the role of aspirations in the dynamics of
poverty22 as such concepts are strongly related to the impact of beliefs about
the determinants of wealth on effort choices. Finally, as already pointed
out, numerical methods seem to be a promising direction for the analysis
of comparative statics and optimal information policies in dynamic settings
with intergenerational inequality and mobility.
21See references in sections 5 and 6 of Piketty (1998) and references in footnote 11, chapter
1.
22See for example the review article of Banerjee (2006) and the models of Heifetz and
Minelli (2006) and Dalton and Ghosal (2008)
APPENDIX A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1. Proof of lemma 2.2
In order to prove (i) (monotonicity), I compute the expression of the first
derivative of Γ with respect to λ:
dΓ
dλ
=πθL
d
(
λθ(µiσL) + (1− λ)θ(µiH)
dλ
+
(1− π)θH
d
(
(1− λ)θ(µiσL) + λθ(µiH)
)
dλ
=
πθL
(
− π(π − 1)
2(θH − θL)(2λ− 1)
(2πλ+ 1− λ− π)2(2πλ− λ− π)2
)
+
(1− π)θH
(
− π
2(π − 1)(θH − θL)(2λ− 1)
(2πλ+ 1− λ− π)2(2πλ− λ− π)2
)
=
π2(1− π)2(θH − θL)2(2λ− 1)
(2πλ+ 1− λ− π)2(2πλ− λ− π)2 ,
which is ≥ 0 for λ ≥ 1/2.
In order to prove (ii) (convexity), I compute the expression of the second
derivative of Γ with respect to λ:
(A.1)
∂2Γ
(∂λ)2
=
2π2(1− π)2(θH − θL)2(1 + 12πλ(1− λ)(1− π)− 3π(1− π)− 3λ(1− λ))
(πλ+ (1− π)(1− λ))3 (π(λ− 1) + λ(π − 1))3 .
The expression is positive as it can be proved that the term (1 + 12πλ(1 −
λ)(1 − π) − 3π(1 − π) − 3λ(1 − λ)) (call this X) is strictly positive. To see
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this, compute the first derivative with respect to λ which is equal to 3(2π −
1)2(2λ − 1) and therefore positive. Hence the term X increases in λ; it is
immediate that X is equal to zero for the smallest value of λ, λ = 1/2.
Therefore for any value of π and λ,X is positive.
A.2. Proof of proposition 2.4
It is useful to plug (2.19) into (2.23) and re-express this as
(A.2) k +
Γ2
a(2Γ− θ(µ)2) ,
where, given that λ ∈ [1/2, 1], θ(µ) = θ(µσL). I compute the first derivative
of this expression with respect to λ:
(A.3)
2Γ2 ∂Γ
∂λ
− 2θ(µσL)2Γ∂Γ∂λ + 2θ(µσL)Γ2
∂θ(µσL )
∂λ
a2 (2Γ− θ(µσL)2)2
where
∂θ(µσL)
∂λ
= − pi(1−pi)(θH−θL)
(piλ+(1−λ)(1−pi))2
≤ 0
∂Γ
∂λ
= pi
2(1−pi)2(2λ−1)(θH−θL)
2
(piλ+(1−pi)(1−λ))2(pi(λ−1)+λ(pi−1))2
≥ 0.
(A.4)
The denominator of (A.3) is positive, so the sign of the numerator de-
termines the sign of the entire expression. I can divide the numerator by 2Γ
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which is a positive quantity and the numerator reduces to
(A.5) (Γ− θ(µσL)2)
∂Γ
∂λ
+ θ(µσL)Γ
∂θ(µσL)
∂λ
.
The value of this last expression for λ = 1/2 is−4π(1−π)(θH−θL)(πθL+(1−
π)θH)which is negative, hence I conclude that (A.3) is negative for λ = 1/2.
I compute the second derivative of (A.5):
(A.6)
(Γ−θ(µσL)2)d2Γ+(dΓ)2−θ(µσL)dθ(µσL)dΓ+Γ(dθ(µσL))2+ θ(µσL)Γd2θ(µσL),
where
∂2θ(µσL)
(∂λ)2
= 2pi(1−pi)(2pi−1)(θH−θL)
(piλ+(1−pi)(1−λ))3
≥ 0
∂2Γ
(∂λ)2
= 2pi
2(1−pi)2(θH−θL)
2(1+12piλ(1−λ)(1−pi)−3pi(1−pi)−3λ(1−λ))
(piλ+(1−pi)(1−λ))3(pi(λ−1)+λ(pi−1))3
.
(A.7)
Notice that ∂
2Γ
(∂λ)2
≥ 0 as it has already been proved in Appendix A.1.
Given the signs of dθ(µσL), d
2θ(µσL), dΓ, d
2Γ and the fact that Γ− θ(µσL)
is positive in the range considered, (A.5) is strictly positive and therefore
(A.3) can change sign at most once in the range λ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Therefore in
the range λ ∈ [1/2, 1] (A.3) is either always negative or negative up to a
point and then always positive, this implies the quasi-convexity.
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In order to prove (ii) notice that the quasi-convexity implies that in the
range λ ∈ [1/2, 1], the maximum must be either for λ = 1/2 or for λ = 1.
The value of the aggregate output for λ = 1/2 is y¯ = k + θ
2
/a, the value
of the aggregate output for λ = 0 and λ = 1 is y¯ = k + θ
2
2
a(2θ2−θ2L)
. For the
output to be greater at λ = 1/2 than λ = 1, the condition to be satisfied is
the following:
(A.8) (πθL + (1− π)θH)2(2πθ2L + 2(1− π)θ2H − θ2L)− (πθ2L + (1− π)θ2H)2 ≥ 0
i.e.
(A.9) (θL − θH) (−1 + π)
(−2 θH2π2θL + 2 θH3π2 − 2 θHπ2θL2+
2 π2θL
3 − 3 θH3π + π θLθH2 + 2 θHπ θL2 + θH3 + θLθH2
) ≥ 0
Observe that
(A.10) − 2 θH2π2θL + 2 θH3π2 − 2 θHπ2θL22 π2θL3 − 3 θH3π + π θLθH2+
2 θHπ θL
2 + θH
3 + θLθH
2 =
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(A.11)
2 π2θL
3 + 2 π(1− π)θHθL2 +
(−2 π2 + π + 1) θH2θL + (2 π2 + 1− 3 π) θH3
Observe that
(A.12)
(−2 π2 + π + 1) θH2θL + (2 π2 + 1− 3 π) θH3 =
(1− π)θ2H(2πθL − 2πθH + θL + θH).
Hence, after a factorization condition (A.8) can be rewritten as
(A.13) (θL − θH) (−1 + π)
(
2 π2θL
3 + 2 π(1− π)θHθL2+
(1− π)θ2H(2πθL − 2πθH + θL + θH
)
,
which is positive. Notice that 2πθL − 2πθH + θL + θH ≥ 0 IFF 2θL2pi−1 ≥
θH−θL,which is always verified in the case π ≥ 1/2which I am considering.
This proves that condition (A.8) is satisfied.
APPENDIX B
Non-Existence of Competitive Equilibria with Dynamic
Inconsistent Preferences
This chapter represents an extended version of a joint mimeograph with
S. Ghosal which go under the same title.
B.1. Introduction
This paper examines the existence of competitive equilibria in dynamic
general equilibrium models when agents have dynamically inconsistent
preferences. Such preferences imply that the individual optimal consumption-
saving plan – i.e. the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution between
future dates – changes over time.
For given individual preferences (whether consistent or not) and en-
dowments, a competitive equilibrium of an exchange economy is defined
as the prices and the allocations such that (i) allocations are optimal and
feasible and (ii) markets clear. Time inconsistent preferences imply two
problems for the existence of competitive equilibria. The first problem
is represented by the existence of an optimal solution to the individual
consumption-saving problem, given that the optimal plan changes over
time. The second problem lies in the market clearing requirement aspect,
in other words to find prices such that optimal choices clear the markets.
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As we will show, given that the optimal consumption-saving solution does
not present standard features this is not a standard existence problem.
Most of the literature has only dealt with the first aspect. The solution
to the choice problem of a time-inconsistent consumer is the object of an
early literature: Strotz (1956), Pollak (1968), Blackorby, Nissen, Primont,
and Russell (1973), Peleg and Yaari (1973), Goldman (1980) are commonly
cited as the major contributions. Strotz (1956) is the seminal paper that
introduces the idea of time-inconsistent preferences and proposes a first
solution to the problem of a time-inconsistent consumer. Doing this Strotz
(1956) distinguishes between naive and sophisticated decision makers, i.e.
between a consumer who is respectively not aware or aware of the fact that
her preferences change over time. Pollak (1968) corrects part of the analysis
of Strotz (1956) and introduces the idea of intra-personal game. Given that
the same consumer has different preferences in different periods, the same
consumer is considered as a different decision maker in each period. If
the consumer is aware that her preferences will change, the best she can
do is to maximize the present utility taking as given the optimal choices
of her future self. The solution of this intra-personal game is the optimal
and consistent consumption plan of a consumer whose preferences change
over time. As pointed out by Peleg and Yaari (1973), such an intra-personal
game need not to have a Markov perfect equilibrium, but as introduced by
Goldman (1980), the optimal consumption path can be found as a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) which is proved to exist.
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The interest in time-inconsistent preferences is resurrected by Laibson
(1997). Motivated by evidence from psychology and introspection, Laibson
and many others consider a special case of time-inconsistent preferences,
the quasi-hyperbolic discounting and apply it to a number of problems.
There is a now a large literature which applied time inconsistent prefer-
ences (not only quasi-hyperbolic) to different topics. In terms of existence,
most of those papers take a quasi-equilibrium approach in other words they
only investigate the consumer solution without worrying about the market
side. Nevertheless, even the existence of the inconsistent consumer solu-
tion is not a closed matter and there are recent papers which consider the
issue in more complicated set ups.1
The second aspect, which is the market aspect, in other words to find
prices such that consumer choices clear the markets has been much less
discussed. Luttmer and Mariotti (2003), Kocherlakota (2001), Barro (1999)
are equilibriummodels where quasi-hyperbolic and time separability guar-
antees homoteticity of preferences, they can characterize equilibria easily
and existence is not an issue. More related to our work, for special classes
of preferences including quasi-hyperbolic discounting, existing work by
Luttmer and Mariotti (2007), Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) and Herings and
Rohde (2006) have shown that equilibria exist. In contrast, in this paper we
1See for example Harris and Laibson (2001), Caplin and Leahy (2006) and Ekeland and
Lazrak (2008).
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show, by example, robust non-existence of equilibria. Our set up is a repre-
sentative agent deterministic version of the seminal model of Lucas (1978)
which is equivalent to theirs. 2
In this note we show through an example that competitive equilibria fail
to exist because time-inconsistent preferences induce both non-convexity
of demand correspondences and satiation. Especially the presence of sati-
ation represents a new issue which has not been discussed by the previous
literature. Those two features combined together imply that non existence
is robust, in other words methods that are able to re-establish existence in
the presence of non convexities or satiation alone and have been used by
the previous literature do not assure existence with a general class of time
inconsistent preferences.
Following the previous literature, also in our set-up given the time in-
consistent preferences the described agent plays an intra-personal game
and maximize present utility taking as given future choices. Just as in the
case of time-consistent preferences, this future behavior can be summarized
by a value function defined over wealth saved by the consumer at the initial
date. However, because of time- inconsistency, the value function which is
induced by the intra-personal game need not be concave, even if the under-
lying period utility functions are. This is because the value function which
is induced by the intra-personal game is affected by the best responses of
the future versions of the same consumer, in other words the future optimal
2We will clarify precisely what is the role played by the assumption of a single representa-
tive agent.
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consumption choices as functions of the wealth saved in the present. With-
out specific assumptions, even if the underlying period utility functions
are monotone and concave the shape of the future best responses can im-
ply that the present value function is not concave. As a result, the demand
correspondences of individual consumers may not be convex-valued. This
non convexity is the first problem that time-inconsistent preferences induce
for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Such non-convexity has al-
ready been noticed by many. Herings and Rohde (2006) do not deal with
the possibility of non-convexities as they impose by assumption that the
preferences induced by the intra-personal game are convex and prove ex-
istence of a competitive equilibrium for this case. Luttmer and Mariotti
(2007), Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) allow for induced non-convex prefer-
ences but prove existence allowing for a large number of consumers. With
one agent non-convexity may imply non existence because it may imply
that demand correspondences are non continuous it does not always a price
vector such that for the consumer is optimal to demand the market clearing
bundle. Nevertheless assuming a large economy, it is a known result3 that
existence of equilibrium is re-established despite of individual non-convex
preferences. The reason is that with a large economy, for an equilibrium
to exist is enough to find a price such that the market clearing bundle is in
the convex hull of the demand function and such a price vector can indeed
3See for example Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) chapter 17.
B.1. INTRODUCTION 156
be found as a fixed point. Therefore also in a case with a single represen-
tative agent like the one that we examine, induced non-convexity alone
does not imply non existence if the representative agent stands for a large
number of identical consumers. The second problem that time-inconsistent
preferences induce for the existence of a competitive equilibrium is rep-
resented by satiation. This issue has not been discussed by the previous
literature. We show that even if the underlying period utility functions
are monotone and concave the shape of the future best responses can im-
ply that the present value function is characterized by satiation points. In
the example that we construct this happens because we allow for specific
non time-separable preferences such that some goods are normal from the
perspective of today but become inferior in the future. For this reason,
the consumer can have a satiation point in the level of savings (i.e. future
wealth), because due to the presence of inferior goods higher savings to-
day can imply a level of future consumption which is too low given the
preferences of today. In our example such induced satiation implies non-
existence of a competitive equilibrium because themarket clearing quantity
of some good is greater than the satiation quantity for all positive vectors of
prices. In other words – as the specifics of the example will show – in our
case the value function has a special non convex behavior which implies
that there is no price such that the market clearing quantity of some good
lies in the individual demand function or not even in the its convex hull.
Therefore in this example re-convexification through a large economy does
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not re-establishes existence. Free disposal and the possibility of negative
prices are standard ways to get around to deal with satiation in existence
problems.4 Nevertheless, our set up consists of a pure exchange economy
where the only way to transfer wealth across periods is to demand assets
and free disposal does not apply to such asset market. When free disposal
fails negative prices could in principle help, but it is not the case in this
set-up because if asset prices go negative then demand grows to infinity.
Technically, the example that we propose is very simple. It is a three peri-
ods economy with a representative agent and no uncertainty about prices
and dividends. The only technical challenge is represented by the need of
a well behaved utility function which allows for inferior goods. We find
such a utility function introducing a class of preferences known as Addilog
preferences which have been introduced by Houthakker (1960).
B.2. The Economy
We consider a simple “Robinson Crusoe”economy over three periods;
each period is labeled by t and t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The economy is populated
by one representative agent and there is a unique asset (the tree) which
delivers units of a consumption good (dividends or fruit) in every period.
In each period t the agent maximizes a life-time utility function choosing
present consumption (ct) and a non negative
5 fraction of the asset (θt+1) to
be own in the next period. The consumption good is non storable, hence
4See the classic references on satiation: Bergstrom (1976), Hart and Kuhn (1975), Nielsen
(1990), Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1993) among others .
5In this set-up short selling on the asset is not allowed.
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the asset provides the only way to transfer wealth across periods. The own-
ership of a fraction θt+1 of the asset at the beginning of period t + 1 yields
θt+1dt+1 units of the consumption good in t+ 1. The agent decides the frac-
tion of asset θt+1 to be carried to the next period at the end of each period
t, after consumption takes place. The consumption/investment decisions
takes place on competitive markets for the consumption good and for the
shares in the asset. We consider that prices are normalized such that the
price of one unit of the consumption good is fixed to 1 in each period, hence
the (real) price of the asset is pt in each period. The model is completely de-
terministic: the values of all the prices and the dividends are known from
the beginning by the agent. At the beginning of period 1, the agent is en-
dowed with the entire asset (θ1 = 1) and the entire paid dividend d1.
Assumption B.1: In each period t, the utility (objective) function ut(ct, ...c3)
is defined on all non negative present and future consumption sets and is
strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously differentiable.
We assume that preferences change inconsistently between period 1 and
2. We formally define time-inconsistency as follows.
DEFINITION B.1. Time Inconsistent Preferences. Preferences are Time
Inconsistent if it does not exist an integrable map f ′() > 0 such that
proj u1(c1, c2, c3) on (c2, c3) ∈ R2+ = f(u2(c2, c3)).
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Time-inconsistency implies that optimal consumption savings plan change
between period 1 and period 2 as the optimal inter-temporal rates of substi-
tution change. There is no time-inconsistency between period 2 and period
3, because period 3 is the last and preferences are monotonic and therefore,
from the perspective of every period the optimal period 3 choice is to con-
sume the entire endowment. Given time-inconsistent preferences, follow-
ing Pollak (1968), Laibson (1997) and many others we define two possible
solutions to the consumer problem.
DEFINITION B.2. Naive Solution (NS). A Naive Solution consists in a
vector of consumption-saving choices (c∗1, θ
∗
2, c
∗
2, θ
∗
3, c
∗
3) such that
(c∗1, θ
∗
2) = arg max u1(c1, c2, c3),
subject to:(B.1)
c1 + p1θ2 ≤ p1 + d1.
(c∗2, θ
∗
3) = arg max u2(c2, c3),
subject to:(B.2)
c2 + p2θ3 ≤ (p2 + d2)θ∗2.
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(c∗3) = arg max u3(c3),
subject to:(B.3)
c3 ≤ d3θ∗3.
DEFINITION B.3. Sophisticated Solution (SS). A Sophisticated Solution
consists in a vector of consumption-saving choices (c∗1, θ
∗
2, c
∗
2, θ
∗
3, c
∗
3) such
that
(c∗3) = arg max u3(c3),
subject to:(B.4)
c3 ≤ d3θ3.
(c∗2, θ
∗
3) = arg max u2(c2, c
∗
3),
subject to:(B.5)
c2 + p2θ3 ≤ (p2 + d2)θ2.
(c∗1, θ
∗
2) = arg max u1(c1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3),
subject to:(B.6)
c1 + p1θ2 ≤ p1 + d1.
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Notice that the assumption that every period utility function is strictly
monotone in consumption implies that both the NS and the SS imply that
all the three inter-temporal budget constraints are satisfied with the equal-
ity. The market clearing condition for this economy is trivial: the agent
must hold the entire unit of the asset in each period (θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = 1)
and consumption must be equal to the entire paid dividend in each period
(c1 = d1, c2 = d2, c3 = d3). It follows the definition of competitive equilib-
rium for the economy.
DEFINITION B.4. Competitive Equilibrium. A competitive equilibrium
with Naive (Sophisticated) agents for the economy is given by prices (p∗1, p
∗
2)
and allocations (θ∗1, c
∗
1, θ
∗
2, c
∗
2, θ
∗
3, c
∗
3) such that:
(i) (θ∗1, c
∗
1, θ
∗
2, c
∗
2, θ
∗
3, c
∗
3) is NS (SS).
(ii) (c∗1 = d1, θ
∗
2 = 1, c
∗
2 = d2, θ
∗
3 = 1, c
∗
3 = d3).
PROPOSITION B.1. A Competitive Equilibrium with naive agents does exist
if and only if markets are allowed to re-open.
PROOF. In each period the objective function is concave. For the Sepa-
rating Hyperplane Theorem it is possible to find prices which support the
unique market clearing bundle in every period. Time-inconsistent prefer-
ences imply that inter-temporal marginal rate of substitutions change from
period to period, therefore also the relative price which sustains a compet-
itive equilibrium changes from one period to the other. 
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PROPOSITION B.2. A Competitive Equilibrium with Sophisticated Agents
does not always exist.
We prove the proposition with an example
B.3. An Example of Non Existence
In order to simplify the computations we fix d1 = d2 = d3 = 1. We
specify the utiliy functions for each period.
First period utility function:
(B.7) U1(c1, c2, c3) = a ln(c1) + b ln(c2) + c ln(c3),
where a, b, c are strictly positive and smaller than 1.
We present the second period utility function through its indirect form:
(B.8) V2(p2, w2) = α2
(w2/pc2)
β2
β2
+ α3
(w2/p2)
β3
β3
,
where w2 is the period 2 wealth (θ2(p2 + d2) = w2) and pc2 is the price of c2
which is normalized to pc2 = 1. Expression (B.8) constitutes an example of
Indirect Addilog Utility Function. This class of indirect utility functions has
been introduced by Houthakker (1960). Murthy (1982) shows that the gen-
eral formulation can be written as follows: V (p, w) = Σni=1
αi(w/pi)βi
βi
, where
w/pi is the expenditure share for commodity i. de Boer, Bro¨cker, Jensen,
and van Daal (2006) formally prove that for appropriate values of α’s and
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β’s the correspondent direct utility is well behaved, although not analyti-
cally specified; the paper also contains an historical review of the Indirect
Addilog System. For appropriate values of the parameters β2 and β3, the
use of the Indirect Addilog Utility Function allows us to impose that either
c2 or c3 is an inferior good for the period 2 consumer, while assuring that
the direct form satisfies the properties of assumption B.1. We impose the
following values of the parameters:
(B.9)
β2 = 1, β3 = −0.5, α2 = .6297714880, α3 = 1− .6297714880, d1 = d2 = d3 = 1.
Given the value of the parameters, it is immediate to verify that (B.8) presents
all the regularity properties6:
(i) homogeneous of degree zero in prices p2, pc2 and income w2.
(ii) non-increasing in prices and nondecreasing in income.
(iii) quasi-convex in prices.
(iv) differentiable in all positive prices and in positive income.
The fact that the indirect utility function is strictly convex in prices im-
plies that the direct utility function, i.e. the dual of (B.8), is strictly quasi-
concave by a well known result in duality theory (Mas-Colell et al., page
66). Therefore it satisfies assumption 1.
Period 3 utility function: any u(c3) satisfying assumption 1.
6De Boer et al 2006 show that the regularity properties are satisfied for −1 < βi < 1. The
β’s are parameters which affect the urgency of consumption and allow for the possibility
of inferior goods. The α’s are conveniently fixed to sum to one in order to prove the
regularity properties.
B.3. AN EXAMPLE OF NON EXISTENCE 164
LEMMA B.1. A sophisticated competitive equilibrium does not exist if the SS
implies the following conditions:
(i) There is a unique p∗2 such that θ
∗
2 = θ
∗
3 = 1.
(ii) For any p1 ≥ 0, ∂V1(p1,p
∗
2)
∂θ2
|θ2≥1 < 0
(iii) For any p1 < 0, limθ2→+∞ V1(p1, p
∗
2) = +∞.
PROOF. Condition (i) implies that with sophisticated agents there is a
unique p∗2 candidate equilibrium price at period 2. For an equilibrium to
exist, given p∗2, there must be a p
∗
1 such that for the representative agent
θ∗2 = 1 is a SS. Condition (ii) implies that there is no positive p1 such that
θ2 = 1 is a solution to (B.6) and therefore cannot be part of the individual
SS. In the case in which we allow for a large economy and the represen-
tative agent “stands in”for a large number of identical consumers, for a
competitive equilibrium to exist it would be sufficient to find a p1 such that
θ2 = 1 belongs to the convex hull of the individual demand function. In this
case, the market clearing condition would be satisfied assigning appropri-
ate fractions of the consumers to different bundles of the demand function
(see Mas-Colell et al. Chap. 17). Lotteries can achieve the same results in
a decentralized way. For this to be the case it is necessary that there exists
some value θ2 > 1 which is a solution to (B.6), but this is excluded by con-
dition (ii). Condition (iii) implies that not even a negative period 1 price
p1 can assure the existence of an equilibrium, because if prices are negative
the unique solution to (B.6) consists in choosing θ2 → +∞. 
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PROPOSITION B.3. Given the period 1 utility (B.7) and the period 2 utility
(B.8), the SS implies that all the conditions of lemma B.1 are satisfied.
Proof of condition (i).
We first compute the period 2 demand functions. Given that the period 2
utility function is quasi-concave, we can apply Roy’s Lemma and obtain:
(B.10) c∗2 = −
dV2(·)
dpc2
/dV2(·)
dw2
=
α2(w2)
β2+1
α2(w2)β2 + α3(w2/p2)β3
.
Given c∗2 so obtained, θ
∗
3 is immediately found through the period 2 budget
constraint satisfied with the equality, hence
(B.11) θ∗3 =
w2 − c2
p2
.
Given that the period 2 objective function is strictly quasi-concave and the
fact that at the period 2 equilibrium price p∗2 it must be optimal for the
period 2 consumer to demand θ∗3 = 1, the period 2 equilibrium price is
positive and unique. Given that by the definition B.4 follows that at the
equilibrium price vector it must be optimal for the consumer to demand
θ∗2 = θ
∗
3 = 1, the period 2 equilibrium price p
∗
2 is that price such that θ
∗
3 = 1
is optimal in period 2 given that θ∗2 = 1 has been chosen in period 1. Hence
the equilibrium period 2 price p∗2 can be computed by imposing the market
clearing conditions c2 = d2 = 1 and θ2 = 1 (which implies w2 = p2 + 1) in
(B.10) and then solving for p2. Given the specified values of β2 and β3, we
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obtain the following identity:
(B.12) (p∗2 + 1)
3p∗2 = (α3/α2)
2.
Plugging the specified values of α2 and α3 in (B.12), we can compute that
there exists only one real positive solution to (B.12), namely p∗2 = 0.2 and
this is the period 2 equilibrium price. 2
Proof of condition (ii).
Given the SS θ∗3 can be expressed as functions of θ2 and can be interpreted as
the reaction functions of the period 2 consumer to the choice of the period 1
consumer. Plugging (B.10) in (B.11) and considering the expression which
we obtain for the specified values of β2, β3, d2 and for p2 = p
∗
2, we find the
demand of θ3 as a function of θ2, namely
(B.13) θ3(θ2) =
.9068709427
√
θ2
.7557257856θ2 + .1511451571/
√
θ2
.
It is important to notice that for values of θ2 ≥ 1, θ3 decreases in θ2. This can
be shown immediately by computing the first derivative of B.13: θ′3(θ2) =
−
xy
2
θ
3/2
2 +xz
yθ
3/2
2 +z
, where x = .9068709427, y = .7557257856, z = .1511451571. A
sufficient condition for this expression to be strictly negative when θ2 is
2z < y as it is indeed the case. Hence, θ3 and c3 are inferior commodities for
the period 2 consumer, over some range of his income.
Re-expressing c1, c2 and c3 through the three inter-temporal budget con-
straints satisfied with the equality, we obtain the period 1 indirect utility
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function:
(B.14) V1 = a ln(p1+ d1− p1θ2)+ b ln((p2+ d2)θ2− p2θ3(θ2))+ c ln(d3θ3(θ2)).
Plugging (B.13) and the specified values d1 = d2 = 1, p
∗
2 = 0.2 into (B.14),
we obtain the period 1 indirect utility as a function of p1 and θ2
V1 =a ln(p1 + 1− p1θ2) + b ln(1.2θ2 − .1813741885
√
θ2
.7557257856θ2 + .1511451571/
√
θ2
)+
(B.15)
c ln(
.9068709427
√
θ2
.7557257856θ2 + .1511451571/
√
θ2
).
In order to study the sign of the first derivative of (B.15) with respect to
θ2, we rename the addends of (B.15) as follows:
a ln(p1 + 1− p1θ2) ≡ A,
b ln(1.2θ2 − .1813741885θ2
.7557257856θ
3/2
2 +.1511451571
) ≡ b ln(kθ2 − xθ2
yθ
3/2
2 +z
) ≡ B,where k ≡ 1.2,
x ≡ .1813741885, y ≡ .7557257856, z ≡ .1511451571.
c ln( .9068709427θ2
.7557257856θ
3/2
2 +.1511451571
) ≡ c ln( hθ2
yθ
3/2
2 +z
) ≡ C,where h ≡ .9068709427, y ≡
.7557257856, z ≡ .1511451571.
It is immediate to compute that ∂A
∂θ2
≥ 0, for all θ2 and non negative
values of p1. Computing the derivative of B + C, we obtain the following
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condition on c and b for it to be strictly negative:
d(B + C)
dθ2
< 0 iff
c
b
>
θ42ky
2 + θ
5/2
2 (2kyz + xy) + θ2(kz
2 − xz)
θ42ky + θ
5/2
2 (kyz − xy) + θ2(xz − kz2 − kz)
.
The condition above can be satisfied by appropriate finite values of b and c
for all θ2 ≥ 1, notice that asymptotic results imply that the right hand side
approach zero for θ2 that goes to +∞. 2
Proof of condition (iii).
Using the definitions ofA,B,C it is immediate to notice that asymptotic
results imply that a sufficient condition for condition (iii) to be satisfied is
a > c. 2
B.4. Remarks
In order to facilitate the comprehension of the example, I plot in figure
B.1 V1 as a function of θ2, for p1 = 0.1, a = 0.7, b = 0.1, c = 0.7, over the entire
positive domain. Figure B.2 zooms the same function in a neighborhood of
1. It is clear from those two figures that there is a satiation quantity of θ2
which is smaller than one. Increasing the quantity of θ2 above this value
strictly decreases utility. I had to plot V1 for a given value of p1 but chang-
ing this value in the positive domain would not change the monotonically
increasing behavior, given values of b and c satisfying the condition in the
proof of condition (ii) of proposition B.3.
Figure B.1 shows a period 1 objective function which is not concave
throughout the entire domain; this implies a non convexity in the period 1
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FIGURE B.2. V1(θ2), given p1 = 0.1, a = 7, b = 1, c = 7.
preferences. It can be easily shown that the possible non-convexity of the
period 1 preferences, which would not be found in the standard problem
with time consistent preferences, originates from the fact that the objective
function of the period 1 consumer is induced by the backward induction
solution, through the reaction function θ3(θ2). The reaction function θ3(θ2)
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may fail to be concave over the entire domain and this can imply, as it hap-
pens in our example, that the period 1 objective function fails to be concave
over the entire domain. Nevertheless, in our example the equilibrium fails
to exist not because of the presence of the non-convexity alone, but because
of the combination of the non-convexity with a satiation quantity in the
demand for θ2. The contribution of our paper is to show that in a very
standard and well behaved problem the only presence of time inconsistent
preferences and the consequent solution by backward induction may gen-
erate both non-convexities and satiation in the preferences such that a new
case of non existence of a competitive equilibrium arises. In what follows
we explain and motivate this point.
The non-convexity induced by the backward induction solution could
in principle be treated with the standard convexifying methods used in
large economies, once the representative agent is interpreted as a “stand
in”for a large number of identical consumers. With respect to this, the most
important reference is the paper of Luttmer andMariotti (2007). This paper
analyzes a three periods model which is qualitatively similar to our model,
in the case in which we interpret the representative agent as a “stand in”for
a continuum of identical agents. Imposing quasi-hyperbolic discounting a
la Laibson (1997), which constitutes a particular type of time-inconsistent
preferences that are time-separable, Luttmer and Mariotti (2007) prove the
existence of a competitive equilibrium.
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The result of Luttmer and Mariotti (2007) can be fully understood with
our model. With a continuum of identical consumers, by the law of large
numbers, the aggregate demand is given by the convex hull of the individ-
ual demand correspondence. In the case of time separable preferences it
can be shown that there exists a p1 such that the period 1 market clearing
quantity θ∗2 = 1 belongs to the convex hull of the demand correspondence
and such a p1 is a competitive equilibrium, even though non decentralized.
Time separability of preferences is a fundamental assumption for the ex-
istence of such a p1. Time separability of preferences and assumption B.1
together imply that c2 and c3 are both normal goods for the period 2 con-
sumer and this is enough to avoid satiation in period 1, because if both c2
and c3 increase in θ2, then for the period 1 consumer utility always increases
in θ2. In other words, if c2 and c3 are both normal goods in period 2, then
the period 1 preference for θ2 is monotonic. In such a situation the existence
of a p1 such that the period 1 market clearing quantity θ2 = 1 belongs to the
convex hull of the demand correspondence can be proved with a standard
fixed point argument, as the convex hull of the individual excess of demand
of period 1 consumer is convex (trivial) and has a closed graph (implied by
the upper hemicontinuity and compact-valuedness of the demand function
and the monotonicity of the preferences). Using a geometric intuition we
can say that a necessary condition to be able to re-establish the existence of
the competitive equilibrium through re-convexity methods is that there is
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at least one optimal quantity θ2 smaller than the market clearing quantity
θ2 = 1 and at least one optimal quantity θ2 which is greater.
In our example, convexifying methods do not successfully re-establish
the existence of a competitive equilibrium because, for any positive p1,
(B.15) decreases in θ2 for all θ2 ≥ 1 and this implies that θ2 = 1 cannot
belong to the convex hull of the demand function. This happens because c3
is an inferior commodity for all θ2 ≥ 1 and the chosen values of b, c imply
that, given an increase in θ2, the consequent decrease in c3 hurts the period
1 consumer more than how much the parallel increase in c2 benefits him.
Negative prices can generally re-establish the existence of a competitive
equilibria which fails to exist because of non satiation when free disposal
is not allowed for every single good, as it happens in our set-up. We now
analyze weather negative prices are able to re-establishes the existence of
the equilibrium in our example. In the case of negative p1, the period 1
budget constraint is the following: θ2 ≥ 1+d1/p1−c1/p1, i.e. with a negative
p1 there is no upper bound on the quantity of θ2 which the consumer can
demand and there is instead a lower bound. We proved that any negative p1
cannot re-establish the competitive equilibrium in our example. We proved
this point showing that, given any negative p1, the unique optimal choice
for the period 1 consumer is to demand a quantity of θ2 that goes to +∞
implying an excess of demand. We therefore showed that for any negative
value of p1 and for a large enough, (B.15) reaches its global maximum for θ2
that goes to +∞; hence in this case no consumer will demand the market
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clearing quantity θ2 = 1. Figure B.3 and B.4 offer an illustration of this
situation, the figures show the graph of V1 as a function of θ2, given p1 =
−0.1, a = 0.7, b = 0.1, c = 0.7. Figure B.3 shows the graph of V1 over a
large subset the positive domain, whereas figure B.4 zooms around θ2 = 1.
Figure B.3 shows that V1 grows unboundedly for large values of θ2 and
figure B.4 shows that even though we can find a negative p1 such that θ2 = 1
is a local maximum, this can never be the global maximum.
B.5. Conclusion
We presented a simple model of consumption saving based on stan-
dard assumptions and we showed, through an example, that a competi-
tive equilibrium may fail to exist once a broad class of time inconsistent
preferences is allowed. In the example, despite the underlying standard as-
sumptions of the model, allowing for time inconsistency generates induced
non-convexities and satiation which cause the competitive equilibrium to
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fail. This failure cannot be solved by the standard methods generally ap-
plied in case of non-convexities and satiation. It is worthy to mention that
our example of non existence does hold for other values of the dividends
and of the parameters because given any value of the dividends we can al-
ways find appropriate values of a, b and c in (B.7) such that we fall in the
non-existence case described in the example.
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